Ritterkreuz award ceremony for SS-Hauptsturmführer und Hauptmann der Schutzpolizei Wilhelm Dietrich (left, Führer I.Bataillon / SS-Polizei-Schützen-Regiment 1 [motorisiert] / SS-Polizei-Division), which were held in October 1942. The medal was presented by SS-Sturmbannführer Rudolf Pannier (Kommandeur Rekrutendepots und des Aufstellungsstabes bei der SS-Polizei-Division). Dietrich formally received the Ritterkreuz on 15 October 1942 for his outstanding leadership and bravery during defensive battles around Leningrad one month previously.
Wilhelm Dietrich (17 November 1912 - 12 March 1944) received the Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes on 15 October 1942 as SS-Hauptsturmführer / Hauptmann der Schutzpolizei and Führer I.Bataillon
/ SS-Polizei-Schützen-Regiment 1 (motorisiert) / SS-Polizei-Division. Dietrich’s Ritterkreuz recommendation reads as follows:
“After the difficult yet successful defensive battles in the Neva bend in the time period 19-25 September 1942 the II./SS-Pol.-Schützen-Regt. 1 under the command of Hauptmann Dietrich (which had been at the hotspot of the fighting and was heavily weakened) was relieved by III. Bataillon.
Following a short pause, on the evening of 30 August 1942 the enemy renewed their energetic breakout attempts. They were aided by tanks, bombers, ground attack aircraft and fighters. But above all they had abundant artillery of all kinds and equally bountiful ammunition supplies, which were expended in levels comparable to First World War intensities. With this support, constant new waves of enemy infantry forces commenced attacks against the positions of the III./1 in the subsequent days. The enemy’s initial goal was to take the road/railway bridge that led over the northern Tossna river, and from there they would thrust towards Mga and the relief forces outside the Leningrad encirclement ring.
It was initially possible to repel several enemy tank-supported attacks while inflicting bloody losses. Isolated enemy penetrations were eliminated in bitter close combat. However, with the support of tanks, the enemy finally succeeded in breaking through the western position of III. Bataillon in the early morning hours of 4 September 1942. At the same time they fed in strong reserves deep into friendly territory through the breach. Hauptmann Dietrich immediately recognized the danger that the Russians would thrust further forwards and thereby collapse the front of the entire Bataillon. An immediate friendly counterthrust failed in the heavy defensive fire of the enemy tanks. As was always the case during these days of battle, all communication links were down.
Despite the strong artillery and Katyusha fire Hauptmann Dietrich personally rushed to the break-in point with a handful of men from his staff. Along the way he sent elements of the III./I.R. 435 to immediately block the path to the Kirow railway line, and ordered them to halt any southward thrust by enemy forces no matter what the circumstances.
After Hauptmann Dietrich had gathered up a large number of stragglers he commenced a flanking counterthrust with these forces as well as part of 10. Kompanie. In bitter close combat, which was ultimately waged with hand grenades and spades, the Russians were thrown back and the breach closed.
The rolling enemy attacks continued. Again supported by tanks and heavy drumfire, the Russians succeeded in breaking through the left wing of III. Bataillon already on the next day. All the officers in the sector of the penetration became casualties, and their units were completely shattered. A gap of 300 metres now existed between II. and III. Bataillon. Reserves or occupied delaying positions were not present in the area. The Russians eventually recognized the opportunity in front of them and carried on forwards. Hostile elements were soon in the rear of the still intact right wing of II. Bataillon along the Kirowbahn. The Russians moved in strong reserves and collapsed the right wing of the Regiment. Several friendly counterthrusts broke down in the strong enemy defensive fire.
Undeterred and mindful of his duties, Hauptmann Dietrich initiated his countermeasures in these crucial hours. He launched a thrust along the Kirowbahn with what elements of his Bataillon were available, and he succeeded in making progress despite the bitter close combat and determined enemy action. After crushing strong enemy elements he was able to close the frontline gap, restore contact with II. Bataillon and rebuild the main battle line anew.
The successful defense against the enemy attacks in these days, and especially during the decisive combat situations on 4 and 5 September 1942, was above all thanks to the outstandingly brave actions of Hauptmann Dietrich. Almost all MGs and rifles had malfunctioned due to being dirtied by the strong enemy drumfire, and most of the mortars were likewise unavailable. Hand grenades and spades were by and large the only weapons available.
In their ceaselessly conducted attacks along this narrow frontage the enemy lost about 10,000 men as casualties. 13 enemy tanks were also destroyed or immobilized.
The enemy’s considerable and (for the time being) final effort to capture the railway bridge over the Tossna and thereby secure a decisive foundation for the relief of Leningrad had failed. This is first and foremost due to the heroic actions of Hauptmann Dietrich and his infantrymen. Despite massive physical exertions, Hauptmann Dietrich was always able to inspire his men through his personal example and in doing so ensure that the enemy suffered major losses in men and materiel.
On the grounds of his outstanding leadership skill, as well as the personal bravery he showed in the decisive moments, I hold Hauptmann Dietrich as being fully worthy of being awarded the Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes.”
“After the difficult yet successful defensive battles in the Neva bend in the time period 19-25 September 1942 the II./SS-Pol.-Schützen-Regt. 1 under the command of Hauptmann Dietrich (which had been at the hotspot of the fighting and was heavily weakened) was relieved by III. Bataillon.
Following a short pause, on the evening of 30 August 1942 the enemy renewed their energetic breakout attempts. They were aided by tanks, bombers, ground attack aircraft and fighters. But above all they had abundant artillery of all kinds and equally bountiful ammunition supplies, which were expended in levels comparable to First World War intensities. With this support, constant new waves of enemy infantry forces commenced attacks against the positions of the III./1 in the subsequent days. The enemy’s initial goal was to take the road/railway bridge that led over the northern Tossna river, and from there they would thrust towards Mga and the relief forces outside the Leningrad encirclement ring.
It was initially possible to repel several enemy tank-supported attacks while inflicting bloody losses. Isolated enemy penetrations were eliminated in bitter close combat. However, with the support of tanks, the enemy finally succeeded in breaking through the western position of III. Bataillon in the early morning hours of 4 September 1942. At the same time they fed in strong reserves deep into friendly territory through the breach. Hauptmann Dietrich immediately recognized the danger that the Russians would thrust further forwards and thereby collapse the front of the entire Bataillon. An immediate friendly counterthrust failed in the heavy defensive fire of the enemy tanks. As was always the case during these days of battle, all communication links were down.
Despite the strong artillery and Katyusha fire Hauptmann Dietrich personally rushed to the break-in point with a handful of men from his staff. Along the way he sent elements of the III./I.R. 435 to immediately block the path to the Kirow railway line, and ordered them to halt any southward thrust by enemy forces no matter what the circumstances.
After Hauptmann Dietrich had gathered up a large number of stragglers he commenced a flanking counterthrust with these forces as well as part of 10. Kompanie. In bitter close combat, which was ultimately waged with hand grenades and spades, the Russians were thrown back and the breach closed.
The rolling enemy attacks continued. Again supported by tanks and heavy drumfire, the Russians succeeded in breaking through the left wing of III. Bataillon already on the next day. All the officers in the sector of the penetration became casualties, and their units were completely shattered. A gap of 300 metres now existed between II. and III. Bataillon. Reserves or occupied delaying positions were not present in the area. The Russians eventually recognized the opportunity in front of them and carried on forwards. Hostile elements were soon in the rear of the still intact right wing of II. Bataillon along the Kirowbahn. The Russians moved in strong reserves and collapsed the right wing of the Regiment. Several friendly counterthrusts broke down in the strong enemy defensive fire.
Undeterred and mindful of his duties, Hauptmann Dietrich initiated his countermeasures in these crucial hours. He launched a thrust along the Kirowbahn with what elements of his Bataillon were available, and he succeeded in making progress despite the bitter close combat and determined enemy action. After crushing strong enemy elements he was able to close the frontline gap, restore contact with II. Bataillon and rebuild the main battle line anew.
The successful defense against the enemy attacks in these days, and especially during the decisive combat situations on 4 and 5 September 1942, was above all thanks to the outstandingly brave actions of Hauptmann Dietrich. Almost all MGs and rifles had malfunctioned due to being dirtied by the strong enemy drumfire, and most of the mortars were likewise unavailable. Hand grenades and spades were by and large the only weapons available.
In their ceaselessly conducted attacks along this narrow frontage the enemy lost about 10,000 men as casualties. 13 enemy tanks were also destroyed or immobilized.
The enemy’s considerable and (for the time being) final effort to capture the railway bridge over the Tossna and thereby secure a decisive foundation for the relief of Leningrad had failed. This is first and foremost due to the heroic actions of Hauptmann Dietrich and his infantrymen. Despite massive physical exertions, Hauptmann Dietrich was always able to inspire his men through his personal example and in doing so ensure that the enemy suffered major losses in men and materiel.
On the grounds of his outstanding leadership skill, as well as the personal bravery he showed in the decisive moments, I hold Hauptmann Dietrich as being fully worthy of being awarded the Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes.”
Ritterkreuz award ceremony for SS-Hauptsturmführer und Hauptmann der Schutzpolizei Wilhelm Dietrich (left, Führer I.Bataillon / SS-Polizei-Schützen-Regiment 1 [motorisiert] / SS-Polizei-Division), which were held in October 1942. The medal was presented by SS-Sturmbannführer Rudolf Pannier (Kommandeur Rekrutendepots und des Aufstellungsstabes bei der SS-Polizei-Division). Dietrich formally received the Ritterkreuz on 15 October 1942 for his outstanding leadership and bravery during defensive battles around Leningrad one month previously.
Ritterkreuz award ceremony for SS-Hauptsturmführer und Hauptmann der Schutzpolizei Wilhelm Dietrich (left, Führer I.Bataillon / SS-Polizei-Schützen-Regiment 1 [motorisiert] / SS-Polizei-Division), which were held in October 1942. The medal was presented by SS-Sturmbannführer Rudolf Pannier (Kommandeur Rekrutendepots und des Aufstellungsstabes bei der SS-Polizei-Division).
Source :
https://www.tracesofwar.com/persons/13244/Dietrich-Wilhelm-Heinrich-August-Waffen-SS.htm
https://www.weitze.net/militaria/64/Waffen_SS_4_Fotos_Traeger_des_Ritterkreuz_des_Eisernen_Kreuzes_SS_Sturmbannfuehrer_Wilhelm_Dietrich_zuletzt_Kommandeur_des_SS_Polizei_Panzergrenadier_Regiments_3__451264.html
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