In May 1943, Himmler ordered the incorporation of the Volunteer Legion " Wallonia” into the Waffen-SS. Léon Degrelle's proactive and demanding attitude is an essential characteristic of German-Walloon military collaboration. Although the German authorities usually positioned themselves skeptically and dismissively from their position of strength, Degrelle's impulsiveness and charisma often put them under pressure.
The Walloon legionnaires spent the winter of 1942/43 recovering at home. During the previous battles in 1942 in the Caucasus, the “Légion Wallonie” was under the command of SS Division "Wiking" (Felix Steiner) for a few weeks. Steiner, who commanded the unit made up of Scandinavians, Dutch and Flemings, paid his respects to the enthusiasm of the Walloon volunteers and asked for the permanent transfer of the Legion to the SS-Division "Wiking" in a letter to the Reichsführer-SS in September 1942. Degrelle was very impressed by the material equipment and ideological orientation of the Wiking. Conversely, at the beginning of January 1943 Degrelle took the initiative and approached the German representative for the Flemish SS, the SS-Brigadeführer Richard Jungclaus, about founding a “Walloon SS”. The head of the SS Main Office, Gottlob Berger, immediately turned to Himmler because the request seemed premature to him: “I would like to ask you to decide whether this question can be addressed today or whether we should put Degrelle off until the spring or summer of 1943.”
Himmler initially left the letter unanswered. Only after Degrelle had formulated his thesis of the “Germanic affiliation” of the Walloons in a media-effective manner at a large rally in the Brussels Sports Palace on January 17, 1943 - on the occasion of the legionnaires' return to the front - did Himmler respond to Berger's request: “About your letter for the establishment of a Walloon SS I thought about it for a long time. At the same time I am sending you the text of the speech given by the clever De Grelle [sic!]. It is very interesting [sic!] that the Walloons are now suddenly remembering that they are Germans.” Himmler expressed reservations about the founding of a “Walloon SS” because he feared that he would dupe the Flemings who were already organized in the SS, but Degrelle's programmatic speech on January 17, 1943 made waves. Although the “Chef de Rex” had already declared the Walloons to be “French-speaking Germans” in August 1941, he was only able to make his voice heard under the changed war conditions in 1943. In the same way, he modified the “Greater Burgundy idea” as a voluntary return to the “Germanic community”:
“Our small fatherland is the West, but our great fatherland is the Germanic community in which our comrades died. We will never again forget the glorious uniform we wear. A German soldier is forever a comrade and brother for us. We comes from the same race […]. In the heart of the resurrected empire we will labor worthily in our western sector.”
From now on, the Reichsführer-SS followed the political change of the “Chef de Rex” closely, and although he could only raise objections to the SS's protection of Degrelle, Himmler recommended Degrelle in a letter to the head of the SS main office, Gottlob Berger, in principle to reinforce his concerns. At the beginning of February 1943, a skeptical Reichsführer-SS gave the head of the SS main office instructions to treat the Degrelle case in a dilatory manner:
“Although it should be taken into account that Degrelles [sic!] has already gone through many changes so far and it should also be taken into account that […] we might be able to gain this small following [Degrelles] if we make the wrong approach, but with that one If we can offend and lose a large Flemish following, I think it would be appropriate for Degrelles [sic!] to be supported in his Germanic ideas so that we can continue to check whether he is serious about his findings.”
In contrast, the head of military administration in occupied Belgium and northern France, Eggert Reeder, reacted quite angrily to Degrelle's “Germanic speech” at the end of January with a nine-page memorandum to the Army High Command (OKH). He warned the German authorities involved not to interfere in the occupation policy matters of the military administration by favoring Degrelle because of their lack of an overview on domestic politics. Although his military achievements should definitely be appreciated, this does not legitimize promoting him as a Rexist leader in domestic political matters:
“For the military administration, one principle must be made clear: As an officer of the Walloon Legion, Leon [sic!] Degrelle must be given every recognition and support that is conceivable. As the leader of the Rex movement, however, he can only be given support to the extent that other currently important interests are not endangered.”
In short, the military administration saw its policy of “peace and order” now seriously disturbed by Degrelle's action. Reeder noted:
“The difficult decisions that the military administration is currently increasingly faced with every day, H.H., [...] make it necessary that the tried and tested political course is steered calmly and without sudden changes right now. […] That is why it is not justifiable if individual Reich German authorities, who cannot possibly have this overall overview, do not have to bear any direct responsibility, through agreements with individual representatives of the local political groups, in this case with the leader of the Rex movement, Leon [ sic!] Have a disgruntled, disruptive influence on political developments in the local area.”
The representative of the Foreign Office in Brussels, Werner von Bargen, also felt compelled to intervene and a few days later wrote a memorandum to his employer in Berlin in a similar style. Von Bargen, who closely observed Degrelle's development and saw him “well on the way” to “becoming a real SS man,” also emphasized his merits within the Legion. However, he expressly recommended refraining from “political experiments” with Degrelle. Here too, the assessment of Degrelle as a domestic troublemaker and an insecure cantonist dominated. However, alarming words from Reeder and Bargen did not achieve the desired effect. Referring to von Bargen's telegram, Hitler ordered at the end of January 1943 to support the “Chef de Rex” “by all means”, because he was “the only really useful Belgian”. Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop immediately commissioned the envoy von Bargen to maintain connection with Degrelle. Under the auspices of Hitler's directive, Degrelle's desire to be accepted into the SS took on new urgency. It was Gottlob Berger who suggested to Himmler that the Walloons be incorporated into an SS unit in February 1943:
“After, as the Foreign Office informs me, the Führer has ordered support for Degrelle, a takeover of the Walloon Legion may be discussed. In addition, the establishment of a French SS regiment would also justify the inclusion of the Walloons in a Waffen-SS association.”
Finally, in the course of March 1943, the question had also been clarified for Himmler to what extent Degrelle was serious about his “Germanic confession” or whether the “Chef de Rex” had just made a tactical about-face. In a letter to the head of the Reich Chancellery, Hans Heinrich Lammers, he told that Degrelle must have undergone an internal change due to his shared front-line experience with other Germanic volunteers from the SS “Wiking” division. Degrelle recognized out of personal conviction "that French-speaking Walloonism must be returned to popular Germanicism." At the same time, the Reichsführer-SS initiated a research project on the "Germanic" descent of the Walloons, so that the head of the expert group appointed - SS-Hauptsturmführer Sommer – had already determined in June 1943 that Wallonia was essentially “Germanic” and that the Walloons, as “descendants of the old Franconians with almost 80% Nordic-Fallic [sic!] blood, were even above the national average.”
While Hitler's maxim of Degrelle as the "only really useful Belgian" had paved the way for the Walloon Legion to become the Waffen-SS and the ideological superstructure was poised with all its might to take it over, a dispute over honor overshadowed the negotiations over the transfer in March and April 1943 : Degrelle's wife Marie had become romantically involved with a special officer in the German Air Force while her husband was at the front. Since she was expecting a child from him, which Degrelle did not want to acknowledge, the affair caused greater waves. The German officer sought to “carry out the bargain of honor,” but Degrelle initially refused a duel, citing a ban on duels ordered by Hitler. The betrayed husband turned to the Reichsführer-SS to obtain support for a duel of satisfaction or – If this is not possible - to obtain a “severe punishment” for the Luftwaffe officer. The head of the SS main office, Berger, immediately took up the case and asked Himmler to take a position: “I […] am now bringing the matter to the attention of the Reichsführer-SS, because Degrelle will certainly come up with the matter at the meeting and Reichsführer [sic !] as the man to whom he joined politically feels imputed and asks to help him.” Even before taking over the Legion, Degrelle relied on the power of the SS in private matters, which naturally took care of the problem of her future protégé. A short time later, Berger reported to Himmler that the Sonderführer had "shot himself" in Brussels and that the problem was solved.
Gottlob Berger and the Flemish fascist politician Jef van der Wiele attended Hochwald in the afternoon of 21 May 1943 for a 3 p.m. meeting when the formation of a Waffen-SS unit of Flemish volunteers was discussed. It was also decided that the Walloon Battalion under the Belgian Rexist leader Léon Degrelle should transfer to the Waffen-SS, culminating in its transfer to SS command in June 1943. Immediately after this meeting, Himmler had an appointment with Admiral Canaris to discuss Abwehr and other intelligence matters. Berger and van der Wiele returned the next day for lunch and a further appointment where details were finalised for the transfer of the Walloon unit. They were joined by Hans Prützmann and then SS-Brigadeführer Karl Cerff after van der Wiele had departed.
On the 23rd/24th In May 1943, the planned meeting between the Reichsführer-SS and Degrelle finally took place in the military training camp near Meseritz, at which the modalities of transferring the Walloon Legion to the Waffen-SS were discussed. Himmler left Hochwald at 10 p.m. by train accompanied by Leon Degrelle and Berger. In a three hour meeting the men ironed out the practical details of forming a new Waffen-SS Walloon volunteer unit, the finer points being decided by the time the train reached Meseritz where he conducted an inspection visit of the Walloon troops. In a secret communiqué, Degrelle confirmed his promise for the Reichsführer-SS. The aim is to return the “Walloons (French-speaking Germans) to the Germanic community and the Reich”. Far from advocating an immediate annexation of the “Germania Inferior” to the Reich, Degrelle set a time period of “25 or 50 years” and demanded that “the increasingly strong desire for a total return to the empire [...] must come spontaneously from the Walloon and Flemish population”. The position paper avoided statements about a concrete roadmap for political reorganization, and the Reichsführer-SS also postponed the "soft-handed integration" of Belgium for an indefinite period of time. However, on the occasion of the takeover of the Legion, Himmler subsequently provided a reason why the Walloons were not transferred into the ranks of the Waffen-SS in the summer of 1941. Accordingly, the Germanization intentions of the Reichsführer-SS with Degrelle would only have resulted in domestic political disadvantages:
“Over the past few years, I have been careful not to get in touch with Degrelle and his party as the Reichsleiter of the NSDAP, who was labeled as 'Pangermanian' and also had such an internal attitude. I would only have harmed the man's movement, which was not yet so advanced at the time. That’s why I refused their request to be accepted into the Waffen-SS when the Legion was set up in 1941.”
On May 24, 1943, Himmler ordered the transfer of around 1,600 Walloon legionnaires into the ranks of the Waffen-SS effective on June 1, 1943 and planned a future expansion of the “SS-Freiwilligen-Brigade-Wallonien” into an “SS-Freiwilligen-Gebirgs-Division”. Command of the brigade was taken over by the Legion’s previous Belgian commander, Hauptmann Lucien Lippert. The uniforms eventually received the SS rank insignia instead of the Wehrmacht one, with the right collar patch showing the Burgundy cross. Contrary to the usual SS guidelines, the Catholic chaplain remained in the unit. Although Himmler had already issued a general order on December 11, 1941, prohibiting the employment of military chaplains in the volunteer units, in the case of the Walloons he “expressly” approved that “the Catholic chaplain remains with the troops.”
In July 1943, the "SS-Sturmbrigade Wallonien'" was relocated to the Wildflecken military training area in the Hohen Rhön for reorganization and, shortly before the start of the Soviet winter offensive in December 1943 ("Dnieper-Carpathian Operation"), to the Ukrainian front to combat partisans. The assault brigade was assigned to the 5. SS-Panzer-Division “Wiking” under the command of SS-Brigadeführer Herbert Gille and managed to break out of the Cherkassy/Korsun pocket in February 1944 with great losses: only 632 of around 1,600 Walloon soldiers survived the operation! Nazi propaganda celebrated the escape of the completely exhausted troops as a historic success. Degrelle received the Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes on February 20th, 1944 and the Sturmbrigade paraded through Brussels on April 2nd in front of mostly Rexist party supporters. In the summer of 1944, the SS-Sturmbrigade 'Wallonien'" fought on until it was reorganized as the 8. SS-Freiwilligen-Grenadier-Division "Wallonien‘“ in Estonia. As part of the defensive battles for the city of Dorpat, Degrelle acquired the Eichenlaub to his Ritterkreuz on August 27, 1944.
The Walloon legionnaires spent the winter of 1942/43 recovering at home. During the previous battles in 1942 in the Caucasus, the “Légion Wallonie” was under the command of SS Division "Wiking" (Felix Steiner) for a few weeks. Steiner, who commanded the unit made up of Scandinavians, Dutch and Flemings, paid his respects to the enthusiasm of the Walloon volunteers and asked for the permanent transfer of the Legion to the SS-Division "Wiking" in a letter to the Reichsführer-SS in September 1942. Degrelle was very impressed by the material equipment and ideological orientation of the Wiking. Conversely, at the beginning of January 1943 Degrelle took the initiative and approached the German representative for the Flemish SS, the SS-Brigadeführer Richard Jungclaus, about founding a “Walloon SS”. The head of the SS Main Office, Gottlob Berger, immediately turned to Himmler because the request seemed premature to him: “I would like to ask you to decide whether this question can be addressed today or whether we should put Degrelle off until the spring or summer of 1943.”
Himmler initially left the letter unanswered. Only after Degrelle had formulated his thesis of the “Germanic affiliation” of the Walloons in a media-effective manner at a large rally in the Brussels Sports Palace on January 17, 1943 - on the occasion of the legionnaires' return to the front - did Himmler respond to Berger's request: “About your letter for the establishment of a Walloon SS I thought about it for a long time. At the same time I am sending you the text of the speech given by the clever De Grelle [sic!]. It is very interesting [sic!] that the Walloons are now suddenly remembering that they are Germans.” Himmler expressed reservations about the founding of a “Walloon SS” because he feared that he would dupe the Flemings who were already organized in the SS, but Degrelle's programmatic speech on January 17, 1943 made waves. Although the “Chef de Rex” had already declared the Walloons to be “French-speaking Germans” in August 1941, he was only able to make his voice heard under the changed war conditions in 1943. In the same way, he modified the “Greater Burgundy idea” as a voluntary return to the “Germanic community”:
“Our small fatherland is the West, but our great fatherland is the Germanic community in which our comrades died. We will never again forget the glorious uniform we wear. A German soldier is forever a comrade and brother for us. We comes from the same race […]. In the heart of the resurrected empire we will labor worthily in our western sector.”
From now on, the Reichsführer-SS followed the political change of the “Chef de Rex” closely, and although he could only raise objections to the SS's protection of Degrelle, Himmler recommended Degrelle in a letter to the head of the SS main office, Gottlob Berger, in principle to reinforce his concerns. At the beginning of February 1943, a skeptical Reichsführer-SS gave the head of the SS main office instructions to treat the Degrelle case in a dilatory manner:
“Although it should be taken into account that Degrelles [sic!] has already gone through many changes so far and it should also be taken into account that […] we might be able to gain this small following [Degrelles] if we make the wrong approach, but with that one If we can offend and lose a large Flemish following, I think it would be appropriate for Degrelles [sic!] to be supported in his Germanic ideas so that we can continue to check whether he is serious about his findings.”
In contrast, the head of military administration in occupied Belgium and northern France, Eggert Reeder, reacted quite angrily to Degrelle's “Germanic speech” at the end of January with a nine-page memorandum to the Army High Command (OKH). He warned the German authorities involved not to interfere in the occupation policy matters of the military administration by favoring Degrelle because of their lack of an overview on domestic politics. Although his military achievements should definitely be appreciated, this does not legitimize promoting him as a Rexist leader in domestic political matters:
“For the military administration, one principle must be made clear: As an officer of the Walloon Legion, Leon [sic!] Degrelle must be given every recognition and support that is conceivable. As the leader of the Rex movement, however, he can only be given support to the extent that other currently important interests are not endangered.”
In short, the military administration saw its policy of “peace and order” now seriously disturbed by Degrelle's action. Reeder noted:
“The difficult decisions that the military administration is currently increasingly faced with every day, H.H., [...] make it necessary that the tried and tested political course is steered calmly and without sudden changes right now. […] That is why it is not justifiable if individual Reich German authorities, who cannot possibly have this overall overview, do not have to bear any direct responsibility, through agreements with individual representatives of the local political groups, in this case with the leader of the Rex movement, Leon [ sic!] Have a disgruntled, disruptive influence on political developments in the local area.”
The representative of the Foreign Office in Brussels, Werner von Bargen, also felt compelled to intervene and a few days later wrote a memorandum to his employer in Berlin in a similar style. Von Bargen, who closely observed Degrelle's development and saw him “well on the way” to “becoming a real SS man,” also emphasized his merits within the Legion. However, he expressly recommended refraining from “political experiments” with Degrelle. Here too, the assessment of Degrelle as a domestic troublemaker and an insecure cantonist dominated. However, alarming words from Reeder and Bargen did not achieve the desired effect. Referring to von Bargen's telegram, Hitler ordered at the end of January 1943 to support the “Chef de Rex” “by all means”, because he was “the only really useful Belgian”. Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop immediately commissioned the envoy von Bargen to maintain connection with Degrelle. Under the auspices of Hitler's directive, Degrelle's desire to be accepted into the SS took on new urgency. It was Gottlob Berger who suggested to Himmler that the Walloons be incorporated into an SS unit in February 1943:
“After, as the Foreign Office informs me, the Führer has ordered support for Degrelle, a takeover of the Walloon Legion may be discussed. In addition, the establishment of a French SS regiment would also justify the inclusion of the Walloons in a Waffen-SS association.”
Finally, in the course of March 1943, the question had also been clarified for Himmler to what extent Degrelle was serious about his “Germanic confession” or whether the “Chef de Rex” had just made a tactical about-face. In a letter to the head of the Reich Chancellery, Hans Heinrich Lammers, he told that Degrelle must have undergone an internal change due to his shared front-line experience with other Germanic volunteers from the SS “Wiking” division. Degrelle recognized out of personal conviction "that French-speaking Walloonism must be returned to popular Germanicism." At the same time, the Reichsführer-SS initiated a research project on the "Germanic" descent of the Walloons, so that the head of the expert group appointed - SS-Hauptsturmführer Sommer – had already determined in June 1943 that Wallonia was essentially “Germanic” and that the Walloons, as “descendants of the old Franconians with almost 80% Nordic-Fallic [sic!] blood, were even above the national average.”
While Hitler's maxim of Degrelle as the "only really useful Belgian" had paved the way for the Walloon Legion to become the Waffen-SS and the ideological superstructure was poised with all its might to take it over, a dispute over honor overshadowed the negotiations over the transfer in March and April 1943 : Degrelle's wife Marie had become romantically involved with a special officer in the German Air Force while her husband was at the front. Since she was expecting a child from him, which Degrelle did not want to acknowledge, the affair caused greater waves. The German officer sought to “carry out the bargain of honor,” but Degrelle initially refused a duel, citing a ban on duels ordered by Hitler. The betrayed husband turned to the Reichsführer-SS to obtain support for a duel of satisfaction or – If this is not possible - to obtain a “severe punishment” for the Luftwaffe officer. The head of the SS main office, Berger, immediately took up the case and asked Himmler to take a position: “I […] am now bringing the matter to the attention of the Reichsführer-SS, because Degrelle will certainly come up with the matter at the meeting and Reichsführer [sic !] as the man to whom he joined politically feels imputed and asks to help him.” Even before taking over the Legion, Degrelle relied on the power of the SS in private matters, which naturally took care of the problem of her future protégé. A short time later, Berger reported to Himmler that the Sonderführer had "shot himself" in Brussels and that the problem was solved.
Gottlob Berger and the Flemish fascist politician Jef van der Wiele attended Hochwald in the afternoon of 21 May 1943 for a 3 p.m. meeting when the formation of a Waffen-SS unit of Flemish volunteers was discussed. It was also decided that the Walloon Battalion under the Belgian Rexist leader Léon Degrelle should transfer to the Waffen-SS, culminating in its transfer to SS command in June 1943. Immediately after this meeting, Himmler had an appointment with Admiral Canaris to discuss Abwehr and other intelligence matters. Berger and van der Wiele returned the next day for lunch and a further appointment where details were finalised for the transfer of the Walloon unit. They were joined by Hans Prützmann and then SS-Brigadeführer Karl Cerff after van der Wiele had departed.
On the 23rd/24th In May 1943, the planned meeting between the Reichsführer-SS and Degrelle finally took place in the military training camp near Meseritz, at which the modalities of transferring the Walloon Legion to the Waffen-SS were discussed. Himmler left Hochwald at 10 p.m. by train accompanied by Leon Degrelle and Berger. In a three hour meeting the men ironed out the practical details of forming a new Waffen-SS Walloon volunteer unit, the finer points being decided by the time the train reached Meseritz where he conducted an inspection visit of the Walloon troops. In a secret communiqué, Degrelle confirmed his promise for the Reichsführer-SS. The aim is to return the “Walloons (French-speaking Germans) to the Germanic community and the Reich”. Far from advocating an immediate annexation of the “Germania Inferior” to the Reich, Degrelle set a time period of “25 or 50 years” and demanded that “the increasingly strong desire for a total return to the empire [...] must come spontaneously from the Walloon and Flemish population”. The position paper avoided statements about a concrete roadmap for political reorganization, and the Reichsführer-SS also postponed the "soft-handed integration" of Belgium for an indefinite period of time. However, on the occasion of the takeover of the Legion, Himmler subsequently provided a reason why the Walloons were not transferred into the ranks of the Waffen-SS in the summer of 1941. Accordingly, the Germanization intentions of the Reichsführer-SS with Degrelle would only have resulted in domestic political disadvantages:
“Over the past few years, I have been careful not to get in touch with Degrelle and his party as the Reichsleiter of the NSDAP, who was labeled as 'Pangermanian' and also had such an internal attitude. I would only have harmed the man's movement, which was not yet so advanced at the time. That’s why I refused their request to be accepted into the Waffen-SS when the Legion was set up in 1941.”
On May 24, 1943, Himmler ordered the transfer of around 1,600 Walloon legionnaires into the ranks of the Waffen-SS effective on June 1, 1943 and planned a future expansion of the “SS-Freiwilligen-Brigade-Wallonien” into an “SS-Freiwilligen-Gebirgs-Division”. Command of the brigade was taken over by the Legion’s previous Belgian commander, Hauptmann Lucien Lippert. The uniforms eventually received the SS rank insignia instead of the Wehrmacht one, with the right collar patch showing the Burgundy cross. Contrary to the usual SS guidelines, the Catholic chaplain remained in the unit. Although Himmler had already issued a general order on December 11, 1941, prohibiting the employment of military chaplains in the volunteer units, in the case of the Walloons he “expressly” approved that “the Catholic chaplain remains with the troops.”
In July 1943, the "SS-Sturmbrigade Wallonien'" was relocated to the Wildflecken military training area in the Hohen Rhön for reorganization and, shortly before the start of the Soviet winter offensive in December 1943 ("Dnieper-Carpathian Operation"), to the Ukrainian front to combat partisans. The assault brigade was assigned to the 5. SS-Panzer-Division “Wiking” under the command of SS-Brigadeführer Herbert Gille and managed to break out of the Cherkassy/Korsun pocket in February 1944 with great losses: only 632 of around 1,600 Walloon soldiers survived the operation! Nazi propaganda celebrated the escape of the completely exhausted troops as a historic success. Degrelle received the Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes on February 20th, 1944 and the Sturmbrigade paraded through Brussels on April 2nd in front of mostly Rexist party supporters. In the summer of 1944, the SS-Sturmbrigade 'Wallonien'" fought on until it was reorganized as the 8. SS-Freiwilligen-Grenadier-Division "Wallonien‘“ in Estonia. As part of the defensive battles for the city of Dorpat, Degrelle acquired the Eichenlaub to his Ritterkreuz on August 27, 1944.
Meseritz, 24 May 1943: Reichsfuhrer-SS Heinrich Himmler (second from right, Chef der SS und deutschen Polizei) in conversation with Oberleutnant der Reserve Léon Degrelle (third from right, Stellvertretender Kommandeur Wallonische Infanterie-Bataillon 373) during Himmler's inspection to the Legion Wallonie headquarters before their transfer from Heer to the Waffen-SS. In the night before Himmler and Degrelle had met for the first time at the Reichsführer-SS's private train called "Sonderzug Heinrich", which was on its way to Meseritz, Pomerania. A private meeting to discuss the fate of the Walloon volunteers took place from 11:00 PM on 23 May 1943 until 01:00 AM of 24 May 1943.
Reichsfuhrer-SS Heinrich Himmler (Chef der SS und deutschen Polizei) inspecting the Walloon volunteers in Pieske barracks, 8 km from Meseritz, before their transfer from Heer to the Waffen-SS. Beside him - face not seen - is Oberleutnant der Reserve Léon Degrelle (Stellvertretender Kommandeur Wallonische Infanterie-Bataillon 373). The picture was taken on 24 May 1943, while most of the sources wrongfully dated this occasion as happened on 24-26 June 1943, when in reality the Walloon volunteers already changed their uniforms to the SS one!
Reichsfuhrer-SS Heinrich Himmler (second from right, Chef der SS und deutschen Polizei) talking with one of the Walloon volunteer during the visit to their barracks at Pieske, 8 km from Meseritz, Germany. Watching second from left is Oberleutnant der Reserve Léon Degrelle (Stellvertretender Kommandeur Wallonische Infanterie-Bataillon 373). The picture was taken on 24 May 1943, while most of the sources wrongfully dated this occasion as happened on 24-26 June 1943, when in reality the Walloon volunteers already changed their uniforms to the SS one!
Source :
"Heinrich Himmler: A Photo History of the Reichsführer-SS" by Max Williams
"Im übrigen scheinen mir aber politische Erwägungen für seine Schwenkung zur SS bestimmend gewesen zu sein: Léon Degrelle und die Politik der militärischen Kollaboration" by Stephan Horn
http://alifrafikkhan.blogspot.com/2010/10/album-foto-leon-degrelle.html
https://audiovis.nac.gov.pl/obraz/51883/
https://www.gettyimages.com/photos/wallonie-himmler?assettype=image&family=editorial&phrase=wallonie%20himmler&sort=best
https://www.mdr.de/geschichte/ns-zeit/waffen-ss-100_page-2_zc-ad1768d3.html
"Heinrich Himmler: A Photo History of the Reichsführer-SS" by Max Williams
"Im übrigen scheinen mir aber politische Erwägungen für seine Schwenkung zur SS bestimmend gewesen zu sein: Léon Degrelle und die Politik der militärischen Kollaboration" by Stephan Horn
http://alifrafikkhan.blogspot.com/2010/10/album-foto-leon-degrelle.html
https://audiovis.nac.gov.pl/obraz/51883/
https://www.gettyimages.com/photos/wallonie-himmler?assettype=image&family=editorial&phrase=wallonie%20himmler&sort=best
https://www.mdr.de/geschichte/ns-zeit/waffen-ss-100_page-2_zc-ad1768d3.html
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