Alfred Jodl was born in Wurzburg on May 10, 1890. His father was a retired Bavarian artillery captain who had been compelled to leave active duty because of his intended marriage to a Franconian girl from a simple milling and farming family. Alfred was one of the five children produced by this union. There were three daughters, all of whom died at an early age, and another son, Ferdinand, who rose to the rank of general of mountain troops during World War II.
Educated in cadet schools, young Alfred Jodl joined the Bavarian Army as a Faehnrich (senior officer cadet) in the 4th Bavarian Field Artillery Regiment in 1910. He attended the Bavarian War School in Munich (1910–1912) and was commissioned to second lieutenant on October 28, 1912. Shortly thereafter he married his first wife, Countess Irma von Bullion of an established Swabian family, despite the objections of her father, Colonel Count von Bullion. The countess, who was five years Alfred’s senior, was an intelligent and vivacious socialite whom he dearly loved.
Jodl saw action as an artillery officer on both the French and Russian fronts in the Great War of 1914–1918. During the first month of the war he was wounded by a grenade splinter but soon recovered and returned to the front in December. Promoted to first lieutenant in January 1916, he served as a battery commander in the 19th Field Artillery Regiment (1916–1917), the Austro-Hungarian 72nd Honved Field Cannon Regiment (1917), and the 10th Bavarian Field Artillery Regiment (1917). He returned to the 19th as regimental adjutant in May 1917. His last World War I assignment was as adjutant, 8th Bavarian Artillery Command (Bavarian Arko 8) (December 1917–December 1918). Jodl remained in the army after the war, and after commanding batteries in four different regiments in the Augsburg area, he began clandestine General Staff training in 1921. His superiors were very happy with his performance, and a typical officer fitness report from his period described him as “very thoughtful, decisive, energetic, a good sportsman, eager, an excellent leader and suitable for higher command.” During the Weimar era, Jodl attended the University of Berlin (1923–1924), served on the staff of the 7th Infantry Division in Munich (1924–1927), commanded a battery in the 7th Mountain Artillery Regiment at Landsberg/Lech (1927–1928), and served as a General Staff training officer with the 7th Infantry Division (1928–1932). Promoted to captain in 1921 and major in 1931, he received an appointment to the operations branch of the Troop Office (Truppenamt), as the secret General Staff was called, on June 1, 1932.
Jodl was a highly respected officer; however, his unbridled enthusiasm for Hitler and the Nazi Party created a chasm between himself and many other officers—a gap that was never bridged. In 1935 Jodl (by then a colonel) entered the Armed Forces Office (Wehrmachtamt), and when Hitler created the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW), Jodl took charge of the National Defense Office. A few weeks later, in March, 1938, Lieutenant General Max von Viebahn suffered a nervous breakdown because he feared war would result over the Austrian crisis. Jodl replaced him as chief of operations of OKW.
Colonel Jodl took on his new task with enthusiasm and leveled harsh criticisms at the army generals (such as Ludwig Beck) who, following a Hitler talk on August 10, claimed Germany was not ready for war. Jodl, writing in his diary, called the generals’ attitude “pusillanimous” and wrote that they should focus on military strategy, not political decisions. He further noted that it was a tragedy that the whole nation supported the Fuehrer with one exception: army generals. He castigated the generals for not recognizing Hitler’s “genius.” Without question, Jodl had unbridled faith in Hitler and truly believed the Fuehrer was politically infallible.
Although Jodl now assumed Hitler would utilize the OKW Operations Staff to plan his military campaigns, the Fuehrer turned instead to OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres, the High Command of the Army) in the early planning stages. Meanwhile, Jodl was promoted to major general in 1939 and assumed command of the 44th Artillery Command (which became the 44th Infantry Division) in Vienna in November 1938. An avid mountaineer, Jodl became hopeful when General Keitel (the chief of OKW and brother of the chief of the Army Personnel Office) discussed the possibility of Jodl’s receiving command of the 2nd Mountain Division in early October 1939; however, he did not get to command this or any other mountain division because the war intervened.
On August 23, 1939, Keitel telegraphed Jodl to return to OKW as chief of operations; there he would conduct the planning for the attack on Poland (Case White). Jodl would remain in this post throughout the war, receiving a promotion to general of artillery in 1940 and to colonel general on January 30, 1944 (the 11th anniversary of the Nazis’ assumption of power). He bypassed the rank of lieutenant general altogether. He enjoyed his first personal conversation with Hitler on the Fuehrer’s train during the Polish campaign and remained loyally at Hitler’s side until the end of the war.
Due to the fact that Hitler turned to OKH to direct the campaigns against Poland (1939) and France (1940), Jodl made the decision to support Hitler whenever disagreements arose between OKH and the Fuehrer. According to his deputy, Walter Warlimont, Jodl initiated an order in May 1940, directing the 1st Mountain Division to turn south (i.e., carry out a Hitler order) without OKH approval. Such an action—in direct violation of the military principle of unity of command—is evidence of both Jodl’s outspoken support for Hitler, as well as of his frustration (shared by his superior, Keitel) with the lack of command authority of the OKW.
Operation Weser (the invasion of Norway) finally gave OKW an opportunity to exercise direct operational control. The Fuehrer sealed Weser for OKW by appointing General of Infantry Nikolaus von Falkenhorst as commanding general of the operation and as commander of Group XXI. Normally, such command assignments were made by OKH and then sent to Hitler for routine approval. Hitler further decreed that Falkenhorst was to serve directly under him and that Falkenhorst’s staff be composed of officers from all three services. Consequently, Weser came directly under Hitler’s command through the OKW.
The operation was planned principally by Jodl and his staff. The German invasion of Norway caught the British (who were themselves planning to occupy Norway) completely by surprise. Although the campaign succeeded, a particularly tense situation developed when the British destroyed 10 German destroyers that had escorted Major General Eduard Dietl’s landing force to Narvik in northern Norway. The British also landed a large number of troops north of Narvik on April 14. A worried Hitler frantically ordered that Dietl’s troops be instructed to fall back to the south.
Jodl realized the folly of Hitler’s judgment. To abandon the battle merely because the enemy threatened the Narvik position might endanger the entire campaign. Jodl pointed out to Hitler that a march south would not only be impossible, but could well result in considerable loss of airplanes, which would then have to land on frozen lakes to resupply the mountain troops. Hitler, having calmed down, agreed to postpone a decision. However, on April 17, the navy suggested that Dietl’s group might be destroyed and thus rekindled Hitler’s anxieties. Even Goering entered the fray against OKW, claiming there was now no way the Luftwaffe could assist Dietl.
Hitler came completely apart and, screaming, ordered Dietl’s withdrawal from Narvik (after promoting him to lieutenant general). Jodl’s staff was astounded. Lieutenant Colonel Bernhard von Lossberg, of the OKW planning staff, refused to send the order to Dietl, and Jodl confronted the Fuehrer directly. Pounding the table with his fist, Jodl told Hitler that Dietl’s group should fight where it stood and not give up. Jodl emphasized that the position had not been lost and should not be passively surrendered. Hitler finally succumbed to Jodl’s stubbornness and allowed Dietl to remain at Narvik. By the end of the month, it was clear that Jodl had been correct and that the Germans were winning the Norwegian campaign. Hitler was pleased and asked Jodl to join him for lunch. For the next two years, Jodl sat at Hitler’s table for meals. The Fuehrer had great confidence in Jodl’s military judgment as a result of Operation Weser, and, for his part, Jodl’s faith in Hitler remained unimpaired.
Alfred Jodl thus became invited into the so-called inner circle of Adolf Hitler. This entourage consisted primarily of civilians; furthermore, as Albert Speer told Dr. Mueller, all were silent, loyal admirers who would listen for hours on end to the Fuehrer’s monologues. Jodl’s participation caused the OKW general considerable grief, for it separated him from his staff; and, since he was a soldier, Jodl considered himself to be merely a “guest.” Nonetheless, he basked in the glory of Germany’s victories in 1940.
Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of Soviet Russia, added another front for the German armed forces. Jodl was skeptical of the prospects for success (Keitel openly objected to the attack), but the OKW chief of operations believed the Fuehrer’s genius would defeat the hated Bolshevist empire. Barbarossa was an OKH theater, while OKW’s task was to make certain that Hitler’s directives were followed. At the situation conferences Hitler turned more and more to Jodl for advice, rather than to General Franz Halder, the OKH chief of staff, even though OKH directed operations in the campaign. A Byzantine atmosphere emerged at Hitler’s headquarters with Jodl and other staff officers on center stage with Hitler. As a result, Jodl “became divorced from his own staff” and even “contrived to bypass Keitel and establish a direct relationship with Hitler.” Jodl was drawn to Hitler by the Fuehrer’s willpower, revolutionary thinking, and initial successes. Jodl believed Hitler had a “sixth sense” and would continue to achieve great victories.
The strategic decisions regarding the Eastern Front brought about the first crisis between Hitler and Jodl. In August 1942, when Jodl defended Halder against Hitler’s criticisms, Hitler flew into an almost uncontrollable rage and never again joined Jodl at meals or shook hands with him. A second, more serious crisis occurred in September, when Hitler became impatient with the lack of progress of Field Marshal Siegmund Wilhelm List’s Army Group A in the Caucasus sector. The Fuehrer sent Jodl to List’s headquarters to investigate the situation and to press for a faster advance. To Hitler’s surprise and anger, Jodl returned and defended List’s analysis of the situation. An argument ensued between the two men, resulting in Hitler’s decision to replace Jodl with General Friedrich Paulus after the expected victory at Stalingrad. This victory, of course, never came. Paulus surrendered to the Russians, and Jodl remained at OKW.
Although Hitler treated Jodl with a cold shoulder for a while, the Fuehrer came to realize that Jodl was indispensable. For his part, Jodl remained loyal to Hitler and continued to carry out his orders. Indeed, the relationship between the two strengthened during the remainder of the war. To his credit, however, Jodl flatly refused to issue Hitler’s Commando Order, which called for the execution of captured enemy commando troops. Nonetheless, even though he realized that after Stalingrad the war could not be won, Jodl believed he must continue to obey and support his supreme commander.
The spring following the Stalingrad disaster Jodl suffered a personal tragedy. His loving wife went to Koenigsberg to undergo major spinal surgery. In part, the Jodls picked this city because it was farther from Allied air bases than any other German city and had not been attacked by enemy bombers. When the Allies launched their first major bombing raid against this East Prussian city, Frau Jodl was forced to seek protection in a cold and damp air raid shelter. As a result, she contracted double pneumonia, which, in her already weakened condition, proved fatal shortly thereafter.
Later that year, in November, Jodl married Louise von Benda, who had admired him for some time. She stood by him throughout his agonizing postwar trial at Nuremberg and took it upon herself to successfully vindicate her husband at the Hauptspruchkammer proceedings in Munich in 1953.
During the final 18 months of the war, Jodl continued to labor at Fuehrer Headquarters. The general suffered minor injuries during the July 20, 1944, explosion at the Rastenburg headquarters when Count von Stauffenberg narrowly missed assassinating the dictator. The blast drew both Keitel and Jodl closer to the Fuehrer. Jodl remained with Hitler in Berlin until late April 1945, when he left for Admiral Doenitz’s command post. Ironically, one of the last orders Hitler issued (April 25) placed supreme command authority in the hands of OKW. It came too late and was a clear reminder of how the dispersion of authority hampered the German war effort. By then defeat was certain, and Hitler recognized that his loyal commanders were, as he told Goebbels, exhausted.
The end came soon after Jodl left the Fuehrer Bunker. Colonel General Alfred Jodl bore the responsibility of signing the document by which Germany surrendered unconditionally to the Allies. He did so at Rheims on May 7, 1945, with tears rolling down his face.
Jodl (along with Doenitz and his government) was arrested on May 23, 1945, and held for trial at Nuremberg. His defense was honest and befitting a soldier who carried out his duties. As Albert Speer wrote, “Jodl’s precise and sober defense was rather imposing. He seemed to be one of the few men who stood above the situation.” Under interrogation, Jodl insisted that a soldier cannot be held responsible for political decisions and stated that Hitler’s decisions were absolute. He faithfully followed the Fuehrer, he said, and believed the war to be a just cause. The tribunal, however, rejected his arguments, found him guilty, and sentenced him to death by hanging. While at Nuremberg, Jodl dictated a letter to the wife of his defense counsel, concluding with the following words: “He [Hitler] had himself buried in the ruins of the Reich and his hopes. May whoever wishes to condemn him for it do so—I cannot.” At 2 a.m. on October 16, 1946, Colonel General Alfred Jodl was hanged. Later that morning his body was cremated, and his ashes were secretly scattered beside an anonymous stream somewhere in the German countryside. Despite this fact, a cross bearing Jodl’s name and rank may be seen in the family plot at the Fraueninsel Cemetery near the Chiemsee. His first wife is buried to the right of his empty grave; his second wife (who died in 1998) lies on the other side.
Source :
"Hitler's Commanders: Officers of the Wehrmacht, the Luftwaffe, the Kriegsmarine, and the Waffen-SS" by Samuel W. Mitcham and Gene Mueller
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