Moritz Albrecht Franz Friedrich Fedor von Bock
Date of Birth: 03.12.1880 - Küstrin, Neumark (German Empire)
Date of Death: 04.05.1945 - Oldenburg Naval-Hospital, Holstein (Germany)
Nickname: "Holy Fire of Küstrin"
Parents: Moritz Albert Karl von Bock and Olga Helene Franziska von
Falkenhayn
Wife: 1st wife: Mally von Reichenbach (1887–1910). Married in 1905. One daughter. 2nd wife: Wilhelmine von Boddien (1893–1945). Married in 1936
Promotions:
15.03.1898 Sekondeleutnant
10.09.1908 Oberleutnant
22.03.1912 Hauptmann
30.12.1916 Major
18.12.1920 Oberstleutnant
01.05.1925 Oberst
01.02.1929 Generalmajor
01.02.1931 Generalleutnant
01.03.1935 General der Infanterie
15.03.1938 Generaloberst
19.07.1940 Generalfeldmarschall
Career:
Entered Army Service (15 Mar 1898)
Sekondeleutnant in the 5th Foot Guards-Regiment (15 Mar 1898-12 Jul 1904)
Detached to the 3rd Pioneer-Battalion (01 Jun 1902-28 Jun 1902)
Detached to the Military Gymnasium (01 Oct 1903-29 Feb 1904)
Detached as Auxiliary-Instructor to the Military Gymnasium (01 Mar 1904-10 Jul 1904)
Adjutant of the I. Battalion of the 5th Foot Guards-Regiment (12 Jul 1904-28 Jan 1906)
Regiments-Adjutant of the 5th Foot Guards-Regiment (28 Jan 1906-22 Mar 1910)
Detached to the Grand General Staff (01 Apr 1910-22 Mar 1912)
Hauptmann in the Grand General Staff (22 Mar 1912-01 Oct 1913)
Chief Supply Officer (Ib) in the General-Staff of the Guards-Corps (01 Oct 1913-00 Sep 1914)
Acting-Chief of Operations (Ia) in the General-Staff of the Guards-Corps (00 Sep 1914-21 Jan 1915)
Chief of Operations (Ia) in the General-Staff of the Guards-Corps (21 Jan 1915-00 May 1915)
Transferred into the General-Staff of the 11th Army (00 May 1915-06 Aug 1916)
At the same time, Detached as Battalion-Leader of the 4th Foot Guards-Regiment (28 Jan 1916-10 Feb 1916)
Chief of Operations (Ia) of the 200th Infantry-Division (06 Aug 1916-24 Mar 1917)
Chief of Operations (Ia) in the General-Staff of the Guards-Corps (24 Mar 1917-11 Apr 1917)
Chief Supply Officer (Ib) in the General-Staff of Army-Group Deutscher Kronprinz (11 Apr 1917-27 Jul 1917)
Chief of Operations (Ia) in the General-Staff of Army-Group Deutscher Kronprinz (27 Jul 1917-10 Jan 1919)
Placed to the Disposal of the General-Command of the III. Army-Corps and then the Army-Peace-Commission (10 Jan 1919-12 Jan 1919)
Officer of the Army and Placed to the Disposal of the General-Command of the Guards-Corps for Special Use (12 Jan 1919-22 Feb 1919)
Transferred into the Grand General Staff (22 Feb 1919-14 Mar 1919)
Member of the Military Representation in the German Peace Embassy (14 Mar 1919-25 May 1919)
Transferred into the 5th Foot Guards-Regiment and Assigned to the Reichswehr-Group-Command 1 for Special Use (25 May 1919-26 Sep 1919)
Relieved of Command in the Reichswehr-Group-Command 1 (26 Sep 1919)
Detached to the General-Staff of the Reichswehr-Group-Command 1 (12 Dec 1919-03 Jan 1920)
Chief of Staff of Military-District-Command III (16 May 1920-01 Oct 1920)
Chief of Staff of the 3rd Division (01 Oct 1920-01 Apr 1924)
Commander of the II. Battalion of the 4th Infantry-Regiment (01 Apr 1924-01 Feb 1926)
At the same time, Detached to Artillery-Course for Night-Artillery in Jüterbog (05 Oct 1925-31 Oct 1925)
Transferred into the Staff of the 4th Infantry-Regiment (01 Feb 1926-01 Jun 1926)
Commander of the 4th Infantry-Regiment (01 Jun 1926-01 Nov 1929)
At the same time, Detached to Battle-School-Course in Döberitz (05 Nov 1926-16 Nov 1926)
Transferred into the Staff of Group-Command 1 (01 Nov 1929-01 Dec 1929)
Commander of the 1st Cavalry-Division (01 Dec 1929-01 Oct 1931)
Commander of the 2nd Division and Commander in Military-District II, Stettin (01 Oct 1931-01 Apr 1935)
Commander of the Army-Service-Office Dresden (01 Apr 1935-20 May 1935)
Delegated with the Leadership of Group-Command 3 (20 May 1935-15 Oct 1935)
Commander-in-Chief of Group-Command 3 (15 Oct 1935-04 Feb 1938)
Commander-in-Chief of Army-Group-Command 3 (04 Feb 1938-10 Nov 1938)
At the same time, Acting-Commander of the Austrian Federal Army (12 Mar 1938-03 Apr 1938)
Commander-in-Chief of Army-Group-Command 1 (10 Nov 1938-26 Aug 1939)
Commander-in-Chief of Army-Group North (26 Aug 1939-10 Oct 1939)
Commander-in-Chief of Army-Group B (10 Oct 1939-22 Jun 1941)
Commander-in-Chief of Army-Group Centre (22 Jun 1941-19 Dec 1941)
Führer-Reserve OKH (19 Dec 1941-16 Jan 1942)
Commander-in-Chief of Army-Group South (16 Jan 1942-09 Jul 1942)
Commander-in-Chief of Army-Group B (09 Jul 1942-15 Jul 1942)
Taken ill – Placed to the Disposal of the Führer (15 Jul 1942-03 May 1945)
Badly wounded due to an Air Strafing Attack by British fighters near Lensahn, Holstein (03 May 1945)
Died in Hospital as a result of his wounds (04 May 1945)
Awards and Decorations:
13.09.1911 Königlich Preußische Kronen-Orden IV.Klasse
18.09.1914 1914 Eisernes Kreuz II.Klasse
00.10.1914 Fürstlich Hohenzollernsches Ehrenkreuz III.Klasse mit Schwertern
30.10.1914 1914 Eisernes Kreuz I.Klasse
24.06.1915 k.u.k. Österreichische Militär-Verdienstkreuz III.Klasse mit der Kriegsdekoration
25.10.1916 Ritterkreuz des Königlich Preußische Hausordens von Hohenzollern mit Schwertern
09.02.1917 k.u.k. Österreichische Orden der Eisernen Krone III. Klasse mit der Kriegsdekoration
03.08.1917 Grossherzoglich Mecklenburg-Schwerinsches Militär-Verdienstkreuz II. Klasse
19.09.1917 Hamburgisches Hanseatenkreuz
10.01.1918 Ritterkreuz I.Klasse des Grossherzoglich Badischen Ordens vom Zähringer Löwen mit Schwertern
25.01.1918 Ritterkreuz des Ordens der Württembergischen Krone mit Schwertern
30.01.1918 Bremisches Hanseatenkreuz:
01.04.1918 Pour le mérite
02.08.1918 Kommandeurkreuz des Königlich Bulgarische Militär-Verdienstordens
00.03.1920 Königlich Preußische Dienstauszeichnungskreuz
15.04.1921 Schlesischer Adler-Orden II.Stufe und I.Stufe
14.12.1934 Ehrenkreuz für Frontkämpfer 1914-1918
02.10.1936 Wehrmacht-Dienstauszeichnung IV. bis I. Klasse
21.11.1938 Medaille zur Erinnerung an den 13.03.1938
01.06.1939 Königlich Jugoslawische Orden der Krone I.Klasse
00.00.1939 Medaille zur Erinnerung an den 01.10.1938
12.09.1939 Eichenlaub zur Wehrmacht-Dienstauszeichnung I.Klasse
22.09.1939 1939 spange zum 1914 Eisernes Kreuz II.Klasse
22.09.1939 1939 spange zum 1914 Eisernes Kreuz I.Klasse
30.09.1939 Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes #1, as Generaloberst and Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe Nord
27.08.1940 Grosskreuz des Königlich Italienische Ordens der Krone
07.08.1941 Mentioned in the Wehrmachtbericht
19.09.1941 Mentioned in the Wehrmachtbericht
18.10.1941 Mentioned in the Wehrmachtbericht
30.05.1942 Mentioned in the Wehrmachtbericht
29.07.1942 Ordinul Mihai Viteazul (Romanian Order of Michael the Brave), 3rd to 2nd Class
01.09.1942 Ordinul Mihai Viteazul (Romanian Order of Michael the Brave), 1st Class
27.11.1942 Magyar Érdemkereszt (Hungarian Order of Merit), Grand Cross with Swords
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moritz Albrecht Franz Friedrich Fedor von Bock (3 December 1880 – 4 May 1945) was born into an old Prussian military family in Cüstrin, Germany (now Kostrzyn, Poland), a fortress city on the banks of the Oder River in the Province of Brandenburg.
His father, Moritz Albert Karl von Bock, had commanded a division in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871. His mother, Olga Helene Franziska von Falkenhayn, was the sister of Erich von Falkenhayn, Chief of the German General Staff during the First World War. At the age of eight, Bock went to study at a military academy in Berlin. The education emphasized Prussian militarism, and he quickly became adept in academic subjects such as modern languages, mathematics, and history. He spoke fluent French, and some English and Russian. At an early age, and largely due to his father, Bock developed an unquestioning loyalty to the state and dedication to the military profession.
While not a brilliant theoretician, Bock was a highly motivated officer. As one of the highest-ranking officers in the Reichswehr, he often addressed graduating cadets at his alma mater, which closed in 1920. His theme was always that the greatest glory that could come to a German soldier was to die for the Fatherland. He quickly earned the nickname "Holy Fire of Küstrin".
In 1905, Bock married Mally von Reichenbach (1887–1910), a young Prussian noblewoman. They had a daughter. In 1908, Bock entered the War Academy in Berlin, and after a year's study he joined the ranks of the General Staff. He soon joined the Army League (Deutscher Wehrverein) and came to know Walther von Brauchitsch, Franz Halder, and Gerd von Rundstedt. By the time World War I began in 1914, Bock was a captain; he served as a battalion commander in January and February 1916. He was decorated with Pour le Mérite, German Empire's highest military decoration.
Bock stayed on as an officer of the post-war Reichswehr, and rose through the ranks. In the 1920s, Bock was together with Kurt von Schleicher, Eugen Ott, and Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord a member of a secret group known as Sondergruppe R, selected by and responsible to Hans von Seeckt, who were in charge of helping Germany evade the Part V of the Treaty of Versailles, which had disarmed Germany.
The officers of Sondergruppe R formed the liaison with Major Bruno Ernst Buchrucker, who led the so-called Arbeits-Kommandos (Work Commandos), which was officially a labor group intended to assist with civilian projects, but were in reality thinly disguised soldiers that allowed Germany to exceed the limits on troop strength set by Versailles. Buchrucker's so-called "Black Reichswehr" became infamous for its practice of murdering all those Germans who were suspected of working as informers for the Allied Control Commission, which was responsible for ensuring that Germany was in compliance with Part V.
The killings perpetrated by the "Black Reichswehr" were justified under the so-called Femegerichte (secret court) system. These killings were ordered by the officers from Sondergruppe R. Regarding the Femegerichte murders, Carl von Ossietzky wrote: "Lieutenant Schulz (charged with the murder of informers against the "Black Reichswehr") did nothing but carry out the orders given him, and that certainly Colonel von Bock, and probably Colonel von Schleicher and General Seeckt, should be sitting in the dock beside him".
Several times Bock perjured himself in court when he denied that the Reichswehr had had anything to do with the "Black Reichswehr" or the murders they had committed.
On 27 September 1923, Buchrucker ordered 4,500 men of the Black Reichswehr to assemble outside of Berlin as the first preparatory step toward a coup. Bock, who was Buchrucker's contact with the Reichswehr, was enraged, and in a stormy meeting berated Buchrucker for mobilizing the Black Reichswehr without orders.
Bock stated the Reichswehr wanted no part in Buchrucker's coup and that "If Seeckt knew you were here, he would screw his monocle into his eye and say "Go for him!"". Despite Bock's orders to demobilize at once, Buchrucker went ahead with his coup on 30 September 1923, which ended in total failure.
In 1935, Adolf Hitler appointed Bock as commander of the Third Army Group. Bock was one of the officers not removed from his position when Hitler reorganized the armed forces during the phase of German rearmament before the outbreak of the Second World War. He remained a monarchist. Hitler reportedly said of him, "Nobody in the world but Bock can teach soldiers to die." In 1936 Bock married Wilhelmine, née von Boddien (1893–1945).
Bock commanded the invasion of Vienna in March 1938 for the Anschluss and then the Invasion of Czechoslovakia.
By 25 August 1939, Bock was in command of Army Group North in preparation for the invasion and conquest of Poland. The objective of Army Group North was to destroy the Polish forces north of the Vistula. Army Group North was composed of General Georg von Küchler's 3rd Army, and General Günther von Kluge's 4th Army. These struck southward from East Prussia and eastward across the base of the Polish Corridor, respectively.
On 10 September Bock ordered the forces under his command to burn Polish villages located behind the front line to the ground if they were fired upon from the settlement and "if it proves impossible to identify the house from which the shots came". By the end of the military occupation of the country on 26 October 1939 531 towns and villages had been destroyed across Poland. In five weeks, Poland was overrun by German and Soviet forces.
Shortly after the conquest of Poland, on 12 October 1939 Bock was given command of Army Group B, with 29½ divisions, including three armoured divisions. These were tasked with advancing through the Low Countries and luring the northern units of the Allied armies into a pocket. Army Group B consisted of the 18th and 6th Armies. While his units were overrunning the Netherlands, in May 1940, Bock attempted to call on the exiled former Kaiser—Wilhelm II—at Doorn, but Bock was unable to gain admittance, the German troops guarding the residence having been instructed to prevent such visits.
Bock participated in the Armistice with France in late June 1940.
On 19 July 1940, Bock was promoted to the rank of field marshal during the 1940 Field Marshal Ceremony. At the end of August, Army High Command transferred Army Group B to East Prussia; this included Kluge's 4th Army. On 11 September, Bock relinquished command of his occupation area in France to Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb.
On 2 February, Bock met with Hitler and questioned whether the Russians could be forced to make peace even if the Red Army was brought to battle and defeated. Hitler airily assured Bock that Germany's resources were more than sufficient and that he was determined to fight. In preparation for Operation Barbarossa, on 1 April 1941 Army Group B was re-designated as Army Group Center. Deployed in Poland, Army Group Center was one of the three army formations which were to lead the invasion of the Soviet Union. It included the 4th and 9th Armies, the 3rd and 2nd Panzer Armies and Luftflotte 2. On the left flank of Bock's Army Group Center was Army Group North, commanded by Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb; on the right flank was Army Group South, commanded by Gerd von Rundstedt.
The main objective of Army Group Center was to follow the route north of the Pripyat Marshes to Moscow. Following the border battles, the task of Army Group Center was to drive towards the cities of Minsk and Smolensk, and destroy the Soviet armies stationed there in encirclement battles.
At 03:15 on 22 June 1941, the first shots of Operation Barbarossa were fired; Germany invaded the Soviet Union with a timed declaration of war.
Elements of Heinz Guderian's force had crossed the Bug River and were bypassing the city of Brest-Litovsk. Hermann Hoth's tanks were heading for Grodno on the Nieman River to seize the important river crossings. Several reconnaissance units from the 4th and 9th Armies had already crossed the Bug and Desna Rivers.
At 07:00, Bock flew from Posen to an advance airfield near the headquarters of XIII Infantry Corps. There, Major General Erich Jaschke gave Bock a summary of the progress of the invasion. Following this meeting, Bock visited Guderian's forward command post at Bokhaly. Bock then visited Joachim Lemelsen, who gave a report from the front. The roads on the Soviet side of the Bug River were already becoming too soft to support the weight of tanks. Despite this, the first day of the invasion had been spectacularly successful. Soviet resistance was reported as being light and complete surprise was achieved. All along the front rapid progress was being made.
On the second day of Barbarossa, Bock crossed the Bug River escorted by Major General Gustav Schmidt. Later that day Bock was presented with reports that Soviet resistance was stiffening all along the front, especially on Guderian's southern flank. Meanwhile, Hoth's forces were advancing with much more ease through the Baltic states and Belarus. The first two days of Army Group Center's advance proved to be highly successful.
Hoth's army advanced so quickly that Bock immediately contacted Walter von Brauchitsch, requesting the bypassing of Minsk in favour of attacking toward Vitebsk so that a drive could be made for Moscow. Initially, the change in plan was accepted but it was soon overruled by Hitler, who favoured the encirclement and destruction of the large Soviet armies near Minsk. Bock wrote in his diary:
The envelopment of Minsk is not decisive. Besides, I am sure that the enemy expects us to attack Minsk, the next natural objective, and will concentrate defence forces there.
Differences between Bock's strategic intent and the intent of High Command repeatedly surfaced. Bock continued to favour a direct drive toward Moscow, bypassing Soviet armies and leaving them to be destroyed by infantry, which advanced on foot, well behind tank columns. Bock argued that if encirclement were truly necessary then instead of diverting his tanks north and south to encircle and destroy smaller Soviet armies, a larger encirclement should be made eastward toward the Dvina-Dnieper River basins.
Hitler decided against this plan, and insisted that the pockets containing Soviet armies must be destroyed before advancing deeper into Russia. Bock, enraged by this decision, was quoted as saying: "We are permitting our greatest chance of success to escape us by this restriction placed on our armour!"
He hesitantly gave the order to abandon the drive toward Vitebsk and assist in the destruction of the pockets. On 25 June, Bock moved his headquarters from Posen to Kobryn, a town about 15 mi (24 km) northeast of Brest-Litovsk. On 30 June, the 4th and 9th Armies met each other near Slonim, trapping thousands of Soviet soldiers. However, many Soviet soldiers managed to escape eastward. Bock soon gave the order to disengage from the encirclement and prepare for a full-scale drive to the east. This order once again caused a confrontation between Bock and Brauchitsch.
On 3 July, Bock's forces were once again advancing eastward, with Guderian's tanks crossing the Berezina and Hoth's tanks crossing the Duna. This day marked the furthest distance covered by Bock's troops in a single day, with over 100 mi (160 km) travelled. Four days later, Guderian's tanks crossed the Dnieper, the last great obstacle before Smolensk. However, Guderian was soon ordered by Günther von Kluge to withdraw back across the river. Bock soon reversed this order, and Guderian was allowed to re-cross the river. Bock protested Kluge's actions to High Command, to no avail. On 11 July, Bock moved his headquarters again to Borisov, a Soviet town near the Berezina River.
On 9 September, Army High Command instructed Bock to prepare an operational order for the assault on Moscow. Operation Typhoon was the code-name given to this new attack, which was to begin no later than 30 September. Bock supervised the planning and preparation of the operation, and a few days later it was approved by the High Command.
As part of the preparation for Operation Typhoon, Army Group Center would be reinforced and replenished with men and vehicles; it would be composed of three infantry armies (the 2nd, 4th, and 9th) and three tank armies (2nd, 3rd, and 4th Panzers). Colonel General Erich Hoepner would command the 4th Panzer Army, while the former two were outgrowths of Hoth's and Guderian's original Panzer Groups. The replenishment of Army Group Center for Operation Typhoon caused it to increase greatly in size: with almost 1.5 million soldiers, it was now larger than it was at the outset of Operation Barbarossa. Bock spent most of the remainder of September on inspection tours of his reinforced Army Group Center. On one occasion, Bock—along with Albert Kesselring—flew over Moscow.
On 29 September, Bock held a conference with his senior commanders Strauss, Hoth, Kluge, Weichs, Hoepner, Guderian, and Kesselring. During the meeting the main operational plan was reviewed, with Bock again stressing that Moscow must be taken by 7 November, before the onset of winter, and to coincide with the anniversary of the Russian Revolution. The following day, Operation Typhoon began with attacks from Guderian's and Hoth's armored forces. Several days later, the infantry armies began to move toward Moscow. With less than 150 km between the most advanced troops and Moscow, Bock estimated that his troops would enter the city in three to four weeks. Almost immediately, Bock's forces encountered stiff Soviet resistance on the road to Moscow.
The 2nd Panzer Army—along with the XLVIII Panzer Corps—attacked important rail junctions near Oryol (Orel) and Bryansk. Hoepner's 4th Panzer Army soon crossed the Desna River and gained access to deep Russian territory. Meanwhile, Hoth's 3rd Panzer Army struck toward Rzhev on the Volga River.
On 3 October, Guderian's forces captured Orel and subsequently gained access to a paved highway which led to Moscow, some 180 mi (290 km) away. Meanwhile, elements of the 2nd Panzer Army reported that they had bypassed Bryansk and were heading toward Karachev. Bock ordered Guderian to press on toward Tula, but within hours this order had been reversed by High Command. The reversal of the order called for Guderian to attack Bryansk where—along with Vyazma—two massive encirclements of Soviet forces were occurring. Bock argued that the area between Orel and Tula remained relatively free of Soviet forces and that Tula could be captured within hours. Ultimately, Bock agreed to divert Guderian's tanks toward Bryansk.
Cold rain soon began to fall over the northern sectors of Army Group Center's front, and the roads soon turned into quagmires as part of the Rasputitsa. Virtually the entire front became stuck; the only vehicles capable of negotiating the mud were tanks and other tracked vehicles. However, these moved at a snail's pace (sometimes less than 2 mi (3.2 km) per day), and fuel consumption soared. This further aggravated the problem of already poor supply lines.
Slight improvements in the weather soon made it possible for Bock's forces to continue to seal the pockets around Bryansk and Vyazma. The dual encirclements of Soviet forces around Vyazma and Bryansk yielded some of the largest Soviet casualties since the beginning of Operation Barbarossa: some 650,000 prisoners were taken during these two encirclements, after which the Soviet armies facing Bock's Army Group Center no longer had the advantage of superior numbers. Bock was one of the few German officers to protest the systematic maltreatment of Soviet prisoners of war, but took few steps to improve the conditions of those being held in the areas under his command.
The weather soon deteriorated again, with the roads once more turning into impassable, muddy quagmires. Since 30 September, Bock had lost some 35,000 men, 250 tanks and artillery pieces, and several hundred other vehicles, many of which were mired in the mud. Fuel and ammunition supplies became dangerously low. Despite these problems, the advance toward Moscow continued as Hitler became increasingly impatient. When advance units of the 4th Panzer Army reached Kaluga and Maloyaroslavets, German forces were within 40 mi (64 km) of Moscow. Guderian's advance in the south was much slower. An attempt by his forces to capture Tula had failed, with considerable losses of men and tanks. However, other units captured Stalinogorsk and Venev, indicating the possibility of bypassing Tula.
As Bock's forces smashed through the Red Army defense lines at Mozhaisk in mid-October, panic struck in the capital. Hundreds of thousands of civilians began to evacuate the city while others were forced into emergency volunteer units. Martial law was instituted as looting and pillaging of deserted stores increased. Marshal Semyon Timoshenko was relieved of command in favor of Georgy Zhukov, who had been organizing the defense of Leningrad. The main bulk of the Soviet government was evacuated to Kuibyshev, 500 mi (800 km) southeast of Moscow; however, Stalin remained in the capital after being reassured by Zhukov that the capital would not fall.
The further Bock's forces advanced, the stiffer Soviet resistance became. The paved roads leading to Moscow became craters under constant Russian artillery fire, rendering them impassable. This forced the German troops into the mud and Army Group Center soon became stuck once again. The goal of capturing Moscow by mid-October could no longer be achieved. However, the sheer weight of the German advance could not be fully stopped, and on 21 October units of the 9th Army captured Kalinin.
As November arrived the mud soon turned into ice as temperatures dropped to −28 °C (−20 °F). While the ground hardened sufficiently enough to support vehicles, the cold weather added to the miseries of the German soldiers as many had not received winter clothing. Frostbite soon took its toll; many soldiers were severely affected and had to be evacuated.
On 20 November, Bock moved his field headquarters to an advanced forward position near the front lines. There he visited an artillery command post, where he could see the buildings of Moscow through his field glasses. Several days later, German forces crossed the Moscow-Volga Canal and reached Khimki but soon fell back due to Soviet resistance. On 29 November, elements of the 4th Panzer Army reached the western suburbs of Moscow. On 4 December, units of the 2nd Army reached Kuntsevo, a western suburb of Moscow. Several units of Guderian's army bypassed Kolomna and reached the Moscow River. Meanwhile, the 3rd Panzer Army once again fought into Khimki. These were the last advances made by Army Group Center under Bock's command.
On 6 December, with the temperature at −45 °C (−50 °F), fresh Russian troops commanded by Zhukov launched a huge counterattack. All along the front near Moscow German troops retreated, destroying whatever equipment they could not salvage. Several days later, High Command ordered a halt to all offensive operations. Bock wrote in his diary:
All along, I demanded of Army High Command the authority to strike down the enemy when he was wobbling. We could have finished the enemy last summer. We could have destroyed him completely. Last August, the road to Moscow was open; we could have entered the Bolshevik capital in triumph and in summery weather. The high military leadership of the Fatherland made a terrible mistake when it forced my army group to adopt a position of defense last August. Now all of us are paying for that mistake.
By 13 December, German forces had retreated more than 80 km (50 mi) from the capital. On 18 December, Bock was relieved of his command of Army Group Center. The official pretext of this decision was health problems. However, this was just one case out of some 40 high-ranking officers being relieved of their command following the failure to capture Moscow.
He was reassigned to lead Army Group South on 20 January 1942, after the death of Generalfeldmarshall Walter von Reichenau from a stroke. Thus, in May 1942, he commanded the defending forces that delivered the devastating defeat to the Soviet winter offensive and severely depleted Soviet tank strength in the Second Battle of Kharkov. On 28 June 1942, Bock's offensive split the Russian front into fragments on either side of Kursk. Three armies (Weich's 2nd Army, Hoth's 4th Panzer, and Paulus' 6th Army)—along with 11 panzer divisions—fanned out toward Voronezh and the Don River. Paulus' armoured divisions reached the Don on either side of Voronezh on 5 July. The Soviet High Command created a Voronezh Front under Nikolai Vatutin, who reported directly to Moscow. Bock wanted to eliminate Vatutin's forces before extending his own flank too deeply into the void created by the strength and speed of the German offensive. Hitler was not pleased with Bock's plan to delay the push toward Stalingrad. On 7 July, Hitler split Army Group South into Army Groups A and B. Army Group A was given to Field Marshal Wilhelm List to command. On 17 July, Hitler relieved Bock as commander of Army Group B, replacing him with Maximilian von Weichs. Bock never again occupied a senior command position.
Bock was injured on 3 May 1945, as his car was strafed by a Hawker Tempest from No. 486 Squadron RNZAF killing his wife, stepdaughter, and a friend. Initially the only survivor of the attack, Bock died of his injuries the following day. He was buried in a cemetery in Lensahn.
.jpg)
