On 8 September 1943, Adolf Hitler flew to the headquarters of Heeresgruppe Süd in Zaporozhye (also rendered Saporoschje or Zaporizhzhia), in southeastern Ukraine. The visit marked his final journey to the Eastern Front. That same day, news of Italy’s capitulation reached German high command, casting a heavy shadow over the discussions. The conference brought together Hitler, Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein, Commander-in-Chief of Heeresgruppe Süd, Generalfeldmarschall Ewald von Kleist, Commander-in-Chief of Heeresgruppe A, and General der Infanterie Richard Ruoff, whose 17. Armee still held the isolated Kuban bridgehead.
The strategic situation confronting Heeresgruppe Süd had deteriorated sharply since the failure of Operation Citadel in July. Soviet forces of the Voronezh, Steppe, Southwestern, and Southern Fronts had launched successive offensives that eroded German positions east of the Dnieper. Manstein’s armies had suffered heavy losses: by late August the army group reported approximately 133,000 casualties against only some 33,000 replacements. Divisions were under strength, reserves were scarce, and the front stretched thinly across the Donets Basin and the approaches to the lower Dnieper.
Earlier meetings had produced little resolution. On 27 August 1943 Hitler had conferred with Manstein at Vinnitsa. Manstein insisted that without substantial reinforcements the Donets region could not be held and that a timely withdrawal to the Dnieper was essential. Hitler refused both the reinforcements and a general retreat. A further conference at Führer headquarters in East Prussia on 3 September 1943, attended by Manstein and Generalfeldmarschall Günther von Kluge of Heeresgruppe Mitte, proved equally fruitless. Generaloberst Kurt Zeitzler, Chief of the General Staff of the Army, supported Manstein’s assessment, warning that the choice was no longer whether the Donets area could be retained, but whether it would be abandoned alone or together with an entire army group.
Manstein’s teleprinter message of 7 September renewed the pressure. He reported that the enemy had already committed fifty-five divisions and two tank corps against Heeresgruppe Süd, drawing forces from other sectors of the Eastern Front, with additional formations still approaching. He demanded decisive action if the army group were to retain control of the situation. The following day Hitler arrived at Zaporozhye, having summoned Kleist and Ruoff as well.
At the conference Manstein again laid out the gravity of the position. He stressed the exhaustion of the troops, the numerical superiority of the Soviet forces, and the danger that a collapse of the northern wing of Heeresgruppe Süd would expose Heeresgruppe A. On the northern wing of 6. Armee a gap of some twenty-eight miles had already been torn open, held only by the remnants of two divisions. Manstein argued that the right wing of the army group could no longer be restored forward of the Dnieper and that only a rapid withdrawal behind the river offered any prospect of reconstituting a coherent defensive front.
Hitler initially resisted a general retreat. He authorised only a partial pull-back on the extreme southern wing and continued to insist on holding economically and politically significant points, among them the manganese deposits near Nikopol and the approaches to the Crimea. Prestige and the desire to retain a foothold east of the Dnieper still weighed heavily in his calculations. Nevertheless, the cumulative reports of the commanders present, combined with the wider crisis marked by Italy’s defection, produced a shift. Hitler conceded that Heeresgruppe Süd might withdraw toward the Dnieper if the situation made it “absolutely necessary.” He also promised additional divisions, to be taken if required from Heeresgruppe Mitte, in order to secure the Dnieper crossings, and he finally agreed to evacuate the Kuban bridgehead, thereby releasing forces of the 17. Armee that had been tied down in a remote and increasingly irrelevant theatre since the previous year’s Caucasus campaign.
The concessions remained limited and conditional. Full authority for a coordinated withdrawal of Heeresgruppe Süd to the so-called Panther Line along the Dnieper was not granted until a subsequent meeting at Führer headquarters on 15 September 1943. In the interval Manstein pressed his case further in writing. In a letter to Hitler he repeated the demand for rapid withdrawal and closed with a pointed observation: had the necessary reinforcements been provided in good time, the present crisis, which could decide the outcome in the east and thereby the war itself, might have been avoided. Few senior officers had ever addressed the Führer in such direct terms.
The conference at Zaporozhye thus represented a reluctant and incomplete acknowledgment by Hitler of the operational realities facing his southern armies. It did not restore the initiative to German arms, nor did it prevent the subsequent Soviet advance to and across the Dnieper. Yet it marked a turning point in the relationship between the Führer and his most capable field commander on the Eastern Front. Manstein obtained a measure of the freedom of manoeuvre he had long sought, while Hitler’s personal visit underscored both the seriousness of the crisis and the limits of his willingness to relinquish control. Within weeks the German forces would begin their fighting withdrawal to the great river, abandoning the Donets industrial region and preparing for the defensive battles that would follow on the west bank.
The strategic situation confronting Heeresgruppe Süd had deteriorated sharply since the failure of Operation Citadel in July. Soviet forces of the Voronezh, Steppe, Southwestern, and Southern Fronts had launched successive offensives that eroded German positions east of the Dnieper. Manstein’s armies had suffered heavy losses: by late August the army group reported approximately 133,000 casualties against only some 33,000 replacements. Divisions were under strength, reserves were scarce, and the front stretched thinly across the Donets Basin and the approaches to the lower Dnieper.
Earlier meetings had produced little resolution. On 27 August 1943 Hitler had conferred with Manstein at Vinnitsa. Manstein insisted that without substantial reinforcements the Donets region could not be held and that a timely withdrawal to the Dnieper was essential. Hitler refused both the reinforcements and a general retreat. A further conference at Führer headquarters in East Prussia on 3 September 1943, attended by Manstein and Generalfeldmarschall Günther von Kluge of Heeresgruppe Mitte, proved equally fruitless. Generaloberst Kurt Zeitzler, Chief of the General Staff of the Army, supported Manstein’s assessment, warning that the choice was no longer whether the Donets area could be retained, but whether it would be abandoned alone or together with an entire army group.
Manstein’s teleprinter message of 7 September renewed the pressure. He reported that the enemy had already committed fifty-five divisions and two tank corps against Heeresgruppe Süd, drawing forces from other sectors of the Eastern Front, with additional formations still approaching. He demanded decisive action if the army group were to retain control of the situation. The following day Hitler arrived at Zaporozhye, having summoned Kleist and Ruoff as well.
At the conference Manstein again laid out the gravity of the position. He stressed the exhaustion of the troops, the numerical superiority of the Soviet forces, and the danger that a collapse of the northern wing of Heeresgruppe Süd would expose Heeresgruppe A. On the northern wing of 6. Armee a gap of some twenty-eight miles had already been torn open, held only by the remnants of two divisions. Manstein argued that the right wing of the army group could no longer be restored forward of the Dnieper and that only a rapid withdrawal behind the river offered any prospect of reconstituting a coherent defensive front.
Hitler initially resisted a general retreat. He authorised only a partial pull-back on the extreme southern wing and continued to insist on holding economically and politically significant points, among them the manganese deposits near Nikopol and the approaches to the Crimea. Prestige and the desire to retain a foothold east of the Dnieper still weighed heavily in his calculations. Nevertheless, the cumulative reports of the commanders present, combined with the wider crisis marked by Italy’s defection, produced a shift. Hitler conceded that Heeresgruppe Süd might withdraw toward the Dnieper if the situation made it “absolutely necessary.” He also promised additional divisions, to be taken if required from Heeresgruppe Mitte, in order to secure the Dnieper crossings, and he finally agreed to evacuate the Kuban bridgehead, thereby releasing forces of the 17. Armee that had been tied down in a remote and increasingly irrelevant theatre since the previous year’s Caucasus campaign.
The concessions remained limited and conditional. Full authority for a coordinated withdrawal of Heeresgruppe Süd to the so-called Panther Line along the Dnieper was not granted until a subsequent meeting at Führer headquarters on 15 September 1943. In the interval Manstein pressed his case further in writing. In a letter to Hitler he repeated the demand for rapid withdrawal and closed with a pointed observation: had the necessary reinforcements been provided in good time, the present crisis, which could decide the outcome in the east and thereby the war itself, might have been avoided. Few senior officers had ever addressed the Führer in such direct terms.
The conference at Zaporozhye thus represented a reluctant and incomplete acknowledgment by Hitler of the operational realities facing his southern armies. It did not restore the initiative to German arms, nor did it prevent the subsequent Soviet advance to and across the Dnieper. Yet it marked a turning point in the relationship between the Führer and his most capable field commander on the Eastern Front. Manstein obtained a measure of the freedom of manoeuvre he had long sought, while Hitler’s personal visit underscored both the seriousness of the crisis and the limits of his willingness to relinquish control. Within weeks the German forces would begin their fighting withdrawal to the great river, abandoning the Donets industrial region and preparing for the defensive battles that would follow on the west bank.
The atmosphere of the war conference at the headquarters of Heeresgruppe Süd in Zaporozhye, Ukraine, on 8 September 1943. From left to right: SS-Sturmbannführer Fritz Darges (persönlicher SS Adjutant bei Adolf Hitler), Oberstleutnant Gerhard Engel (Adjutant des Heeres beim Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein (Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe Süd), Oberst im Generalstab Joachim Meichßner (Chef der Organisationsabteilung im Wehrmachtführungsstab), Generalleutnant Theodor Busse (Chef des Generalstabes Heeresgruppe Süd), Adolf Hitler (Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), and General der Infanterie Kurt Zeitzler (Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres).
The atmosphere of the war conference at the headquarters of Heeresgruppe Süd in Zaporozhye, Ukraine, on 8 September 1943. From left to right: Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein (Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe Süd), Adolf Hitler (Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), Generalleutnant Theodor Busse (Chef des Generalstabes Heeresgruppe Süd), General der Infanterie Kurt Zeitzler (Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres), and Generalfeldmarschall Ewald von Kleist (Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe A).
The atmosphere of the war conference at the headquarters of Heeresgruppe Süd in Zaporozhye, Ukraine, on 8 September 1943. From left to right: Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein (Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe Süd), Generalleutnant Theodor Busse (Chef des Generalstabes Heeresgruppe Süd), Adolf Hitler (Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), General der Infanterie Kurt Zeitzler (Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres), Generalfeldmarschall Ewald von Kleist (Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe A), dan Generalleutnant Hans Röttiger (Chef des Generalstabes Heeresgruppe A).
The atmosphere of the war conference at the headquarters of Heeresgruppe Süd in Zaporozhye, Ukraine, on 8 September 1943. From left to right: Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein (Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe Süd), Adolf Hitler (Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), Generalleutnant Theodor Busse (Chef des Generalstabes Heeresgruppe Süd), General der Infanterie Kurt Zeitzler (Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres), dan Generalfeldmarschall Ewald von Kleist (Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe A).
The atmosphere of the war conference at the headquarters of Heeresgruppe Süd in Zaporozhye, Ukraine, on 8 September 1943. From left to right: Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein (Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe Süd), Adolf Hitler (Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), Generalleutnant Theodor Busse (Chef des Generalstabes Heeresgruppe Süd), General der Infanterie Kurt Zeitzler (Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres), dan Generalfeldmarschall Ewald von Kleist (Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe A).
The atmosphere of the war conference at the headquarters of Heeresgruppe Süd in Zaporozhye, Ukraine, on 8 September 1943. From left to right:SS-Sturmbannführer Fritz Darges (persönlicher SS Adjutant bei Adolf Hitler), Oberstleutnant Gerhard Engel (Adjutant des Heeres beim Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein (Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe Süd), Adolf Hitler (Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht), Generalleutnant Theodor Busse (Chef des Generalstabes Heeresgruppe Süd), General der Infanterie Kurt Zeitzler (Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres), dan Generalfeldmarschall Ewald von Kleist (Oberbefehlshaber Heeresgruppe A).
Source :
https://alifrafikkhan.blogspot.com/2012/11/album-foto-adolf-hitler-sebagai-ahli.html
https://www.criticalpast.com/video/65675078957_Hitler-visiting-von-Manstein_Zaporozhye-Airfield_Ukraine_Eastern-Front
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OMbi6PFjG-M
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