Bruno Streckenbach
Date of Birth: 07.02.1902 - Hamburg (German Empire)
Date of Death: 28.10.1977 - Hamburg (West Germany)
NSDAP Number: unknown (joined 01.10.1930)
SS Number: unknown (joined 01.09.1931)
Parents: Hans Heinrich Hugo Streckenbach (30 August 1869) and Minna Johanna Elisabeth Spenner (4 May 1877)
Wife: Klara Luise Wulff (divorced 11.07.1926); Helene Karolina Amanda Steinhard (married 20.10.1927 and divorced 11.06.1934; Franziska Konradone Dore Hartjen (married 15.07.1937)
Children: A son and a daughter (from third marriage)
Promotions:
24.12.1932 SS-Sturmführer
12.06.1933 SS-Hauptsturmführer
02.09.1933 SS-Sturmbannführer
09.11.1933 SS-Obersturmbannführer
20.04.1934 SS-Standartenführer
00.00.1935 Feldwebel der Reserve
12.09.1936 SS-Oberführer
20.04.1939 SS-Brigadeführer
01.01.1941 SS-Brigadeführer und Generalmajor der Polizei
09.11.1941 SS-Gruppenführer und Generalleutnant der Polizei
18.01.1943 SS-Untersturmführer der Reserve der Waffen-SS
01.03.1943 SS-Obersturmführer der Reserve der Waffen-SS
10.03.1943 SS-Hauptsturmführer der Reserve der Waffen-SS
11.03.1943 SS-Sturmbannführer der Reserve der Waffen-SS
01.07.1943 SS-Obersturmbannführer der Reserve der Waffen-SS
28.08.1943 SS-Standartenführer der Reserve der Waffen-SS
30.01.1944 SS-Oberführer der Reserve der Waffen-SS
01.07.1944 SS-Brigadeführer der Reserve und Generalmajor der Reserve der Waffen-SS
09.11.1944 SS-Gruppenführer der Reserve und Generalleutnant der Reserve der Waffen-SS
Career:
00.00.190_ Volksschule
00.00.1908 Realgymnasium des Hamburger Johanneums
00.10.1918 Unterprimaner Jungmann-Etappen-Kommando
00.02.1919 Oberprimaner Freikorps Hermann
00.00.19__ Freiwilligen Wachtabteilung Bahrenfeld
00.00.19__ Norddeutschen Heimatbund
00.00.19__ Wehrwolf
00.00.19__ Fremdsprachenkorrespondent
00.00.1925 Gaugeschäftsführer ADAC in Hamburg
00.00.1928 Verkäufer Stöver-Werken
01.10.1930 Member of NSDAP
00.12.1930 Member of SA
01.09.1931 Member of SS
00.00.193_ - 00.00.1932 Autovermietung "Selbstfahrer-Union"
00.00.1932 Werbevertreter Automobilbranche
00.12.1932 Führer Sturmbann I / 28. SS-Standarte
00.00.1933 Werbeabteilung Norddeutschen Rundfunk
20.10.1933 Leiter der politischen Polizei Hamburg
00.00.193_ Leiter Zeitfunkabteilung Norddeutschen Rundfunk
00.00.193_ Polizeidirektion München
05.10.1933 Regierungsrat
01.02.1938 Regierungsdirektor / Inspekteur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (IdS), Wehrkreis X
00.09.1939 Führer Einsatzgruppe 1 / 14.Armee
01.11.1939 Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (BdS), Krakau
12.06.1940 Chef Amt I (Organisation, Verwaltung und Recht) in Reichssicherheitshauptamtes (RSHA)
11.07.1942 Stellvertretender Gerichtsherr des RSHA
00.12.1942 Entered Waffen-SS
15.01.1943 Panzerjäger-Ersatz-Abteilung, Hilversum
15.03.1943 Führer Panzerjäger-Abteilung 8 / SS-Kavallerie-Division "Florian Geyer"
00.00.194_ Panzertruppschule Wunsdorf
10.01.1944 Kommandeur 8. SS-Kavallerie-Division "Florian Geyer"
01.04.1944 Führer 19. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS "Latvia" (lettische Nr. 2)
10.05.1945 POW Soviet forces
18.02.1954 Convicted to 25 years forced labour, Mosow Military Tribune
00.00.195_ Wladimir Prison
10.10.1955 Released
00.00.19__ - 30.06.1969 kaufmännischer Angestellter und Prokurist, Ottenser Eisenwerk GmbH
Awards and Decorations:
00.00.1924 Meisterschaftsabzeichen des Deutschen Ruderverbandes
00.00.193_ SS-Totenkopfring
00.00.193_ Ehrendegen des Reichsführers-SS
16.12.1935 Julleuchter der SS
00.00.193_ SA-Sportabzeichen in Bronze
24.08.1938 Magyar Érdemkereszt (Hungarian Order of Merit)
30.01.1939 Goldenes Parteiabzeichen der NSDAP
00.00.19__ Dienstauszeichnungen der NSDAP in Bronze und Silber
00.00.19__ SS-Dienstauszeichnungen, 3. und 2. Stufe (12 Jahre)
00.09.1939 Eisernes Kreuz II.Klasse
30.01.1942 Kriegsverdienstkreuz II.Klasse mit Schwertern
30.01.1942 Kriegsverdienstkreuz I.Klasse mit Schwertern
15.07.1943 Eisernes Kreuz I.Klasse
06.09.1943 Tapferkeitsauszeichnung für Angehörige der Ostvölker I.Klasse in Silber
25.09.1943 Allgemeines-Sturmabzeichen
30.10.1943 Nahkampfspange in Bronze
15.12.1943 Deutsches Kreuz in Gold
09.08.1944 Mentioned in the Wehrmachtbericht: "Im Nordabschnitt der Ostfront haben sich die norddeutsche 83. Infanteriedivision unter Oberst Götz mit unterstellten Teilen der ostpreußischen 61. Infanteriedivision und die 19. lettische SS-Division unter Führung von SS-Brigadeführer und Generalmajor der Waffen-SS Streckenbach in Angriff und Abwehr besonders bewährt." (In the northern section of the Eastern Front, the North German 83rd Infantry Division under Colonel Götz with subordinate parts of the East Prussian 61st Infantry Division and the 19th Latvian SS Division under the leadership of SS Brigadefuhrer and Major General of the Waffen-SS Streckenbach have proven themselves in attack and defense).
27.08.1944 Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes, as SS-Brigadeführer und Generalmajor der Waffen-SS and Kommandeur 19. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (lettische Nr. 2). Streckenbach’s Ritterkreuz recommendation reads as follows: “On the 06.08.1944 the Kampfgruppe 19. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (Lett. Nr. 2) was engaged in combat behind the Aiviekste river (west of Lake Lubana), however it did not have friendly contact to either the left or right as a result of deep hostile penetrations. During the afternoon an attack by a Soviet Division from the north threatened to sever the single retirement road of the Division at a point northwest of Lubana. High command ordered that this penetration be sealed off. In this precarious situation SS-Brigadeführer Streckenbach made the decision to go over to the attack. He assembled all available reserves (including every last supply driver and clerk he could find) and then personally led a pincer maneuver against the broken-in hostile elements. Success: Total destruction of 2 Soviet rifle regiments, Division was able to pull back as ordered along the sole available route. SS-Brigadeführer had been the soul of resistance for his Division since the beginning of its prolonged withdrawal on the 10.07.1944. Throughout this time he rushed from Kompanie to Kompanie in the foremost line, all while rallying wavering units and upholding the combat morale of his Latvian formations. The countermeasures that he executed during this period repeatedly led to notable successes. His proven personal bravery and leadership qualities make him a particularly worthy candidate for being awarded the Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes.”
30.09.1944 Mentioned in the Wehrmachtbericht: "In der Abwehrschlacht in Lettland hat sich die 19. Waffengenadierdivision der SS (lettische Nr. 2) unter Führung von SS-Brigadeführer und Generalmajor der Waffen-SS Streckenbach bei der Verteidigung ihres Heimatbodens hervorragend geschlagen." (In the defensive battle in Latvia, the 19th Waffen Genadier Division of the SS (Latvian No. 2) under the leadership of SS Brigadefuehrer and Major General of the Waffen-SS Streckenbach did an excellent job in defending their homeland).
27.12.1944 Mentioned in the Wehrmachtbericht: "Bei den schweren Abwehrkämpfen in Kurland haben sich die 205. Infanteriedivision unter Führung des Generalleutnants von Mellenthin und die 19. Freiwilligendivision unter SS-Gruppenführer und Generalleutnant der Waffen-SS Streckenbach hervorragend geschlagen." (During the heavy defensive fighting in Kurland, the 205th Infantry Division under the command of Lieutenant General von Mellenthin and the 19th Volunteer Division under SS Group Leader and Lieutenant General of the Waffen-SS Streckenbach did extremely well).
16.01.1945 Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes mit Eichenlaub #701, as SS-Gruppenführer und Generalleutnant der Waffen-SS and Kommandeur 19. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (lettische Nr. 2). “During the morning hours of the 23.12.1944 the Russians conducted a short yet ferocious artillery barrage before launching a surprise multi-division assault against the left neighbouring Division (Gruppe Henze) as well as the left wing of the 19. Waffen-Grenadier-Division. Although the Division was able to repulse all attacks against it, the enemy was able to achieve a deep penetration in the sector of the left neighbouring Division. Within a short time the foe had overrun the second position, and then they pressed on to the Artillerie’s defensive screen. Enemy forces pivoted to the northwest, and by pushing on in this direction they threatened to cut off the left wing of the Division. This could easily have led to the disintegration of the frontline: the enemy would have achieved their deep penetration and thereby enabled their planned breakthrough to proceed. In this particularly critical moment SS-Gruppenführer Streckenbach decided to first order his Waffen-Gren.Rgt. 42 to form a blocking front. At the same time he planned to commit all available forces against the enemy’s main thrust in the left flank of his Division. These included the II./W.-Gren.Rgt. 43, the existing alarm units from the supply troops and the Kampfschule of the Feld-Ers.Btl. Although his right flank was also being attacked at several points he nonetheless pull additional elements from it in order to reinforce his left wing. This risky decision paid off however, as it held up the deep flank of his Division and ensured that the hostile thrust towards the northwest would be temporarily contained. However the enemy pressure against the deep flank of the 19. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS continued to increase throughout the 24.12.1944, and so during the afternoon the divisional commander was assigned the II./Gren.Rgt. 273 of the 93. Infanterie-Division (which had been brought up via motor transport). On the morning of the next day he did not use it to seal off the new hostile penetrations, but rather he used it to deliberately counterattack the flank of this enemy thrust. This countermeasure again halted the enemy’s thrust to the northwest for the time being, and it also helped buttress the ever-lengthening deep flank of the Division. This initiative by the divisional commander was the deciding factor that enabled the extended frontline of the 19. Waffen-Gren.Div. der SS to be held for 4 days long despite strong enemy attacks in the front and flank. Such an action furthermore presented the enemy with a dangerous flank threat for their own thrust to the northwest. It was only on the night of the 26./27.12.1944 that the frontline of the 19. Waffen-Gren. Division der SS was pulled back to the Artillerie defensive position due to the situation in the sector of Gruppe Henze. The Korps’ ability to delay this breakthrough attempt by 6 divisions and 1 Soviet Tank Corps with its own weak forces bought enough time for armoured reinforcements to arrive from other sectors of the Courland front, and once they had arrived it was possible to transition to a more active form of combat. This outstanding achievement by the 19. Waffen-Gren.Div. der SS (which was notable enough to merit a mention in the Wehrmachtbericht) is largely attributable to the clear and energetic leadership of its commander. He personally directed the heavy forest combat of his Latvians from the vicinity of the regimental command posts, and everywhere he was the soul of the bitter resistance. Captured Russian officers stated that these combat days were some of the worst they had seen in the entire war. Up until now this Latvian Division has held its ground in an exemplary fashion whilst engaged in defensive combat. It shows clear evidence of having been influenced by the personality of its commander. The high combat value of his unit can be credited to the decisiveness, energetic leadership and personal devotion to duty displayed by the divisional commander, SS-Gruppenführer Streckenbach. In these 9 major days of combat the Russians suffered heavy losses in men at the hands of the 19. Waffen-Gren.Div. der SS. They also sustained the following materiel losses to the Division in this time: 1 aircraft (to infantry weapons), 18 tanks (including 8 to close combat weapons), 1 assault gun, 18 anti-tank guns, 12 trucks, 26 medium and heavy mortars, 44 heavy machine-guns, 156 light machine-guns, and numerous additional war materiel. 104 prisoners were also captured (including 4 deserters). In these days of bitter forest combat along a wide front, the Division inflicted such heavy losses on 3 attacking Russian divisions that the enemy was forced to call off their assault on the 01.01.1945. The defensive resolve of this Division laid the groundwork for the crushing defeat sustained by the Russian 22nd Army during the first days of January.”
00.00.1945 Ärmelband "Kurland"
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Bruno Streckenbach (7 February 1902 – 28 October 1977) was born in Hamburg, Germany on 7 February 1902. His highest education was Gymnasium, which he left in April 1918 to voluntarily report to the German Army during World War I. Just like his close colleagues Erwin Schulz and Heinrich Himmler, he never served on the front lines of the battlefield due to the ceasefire that took place in November 1918.
After the end of the First World War, he was an active member of the Freikorps Bahrenfeld, which took part in the 1920 Kapp-Putsch. He was employed as a wholesale merchant, tried his hand at advertising, being a radio editor and also trying to establish himself as the director of a local office.
1933 was a huge year for many soon-to-be SS and police officers. As some historians have mentioned, for people like Streckenbach, 1933 was the year in which they assumed positions of the Gestapo (Political Police), but also the year which they were put into “leadership positions, posts they would hardly have occupied without the National Socialist seizure of power.” Following the Reichstag Fire on 27 February 1933 which the Nazis falsely propagated to be “communist-led,” there was a suspension of constitutional rights in the Weimar Republic, which increased the power of the government. Protests occurred and subsequently severe persecution towards left-wing politicians followed the Presidential Decree for the Protection of Volk and State on 28 February. In the March 5 Reichstag Elections, the National Socialists won power, although only upon merging with the Deutschnationale Volkspartei. After having the majority vote, the Nazi's seized full power. Persecution against political opponents and Jews increased, as did incidence of brutal assault, sporadic murder, and arson. It was during this seizure of power that many of the future leaders of the RSHA were given their first positions in the party.
More than a quarter of the future RSHA leaders had already been police officers in their respective home towns before 1933. In 1933, almost two-thirds of these men were given political police positions in their towns or cities, or sent to Berlin as a part of the Gestapo Office. Streckenbach himself only entered the police force on 31 August 1931 as the leader of the SS-Sturmbanner in Hamburg, Streckenbach's placement as chief of the Gestapo in Hamburg illustrates the “superficiality of professional continuity” – referring to the lack of qualifications many candidates possessed – as some historians characterize the Nazi Party's seizure of power. For years, these young radical right-wing militants had been marginalized, but with the rise of the Nazis, they were now given the chance to pursue a career which preserved their radical and violent worldviews, and indeed encouraged such behaviour. Historian Bradley Smith argues that the Nazi seizure of power offered these young men, including Bruno Streckenbach, a career which abided by and even enhanced their radicalism, and provided professional advancements which they had failed to receive in their careers up to this point.
Reinhard Heydrich and Himmler were always trying to expand their power and authority beyond the confines of the German Reich. In accordance with Hitler's notion of Lebensraum, active persecution against Polish people, and long-term goals of “conquering extensive territories in the Soviet Union”, Hitler and other top Nazi leadership started preparing for a war, marked by the invasion of Poland. In preparation for the invasion of Poland, Heydrich expressed his ambition of having mobilized killing squads, a “fighting administration” as he put it.
The Einsatzgruppen were in charge of securing German power and occupational authority in Poland through terror, furthering the ideology of ethnic cleansing and Lebensraum via deportations out of the occupied territory and mass executions within. The number of Einsatzgruppen corresponded to the Wehrmacht army units deployed. The leaders of the Sicherheitspolizei (SiPo; Security Police) in Berlin selected the office heads of the Einsatzgruppen very carefully, most of them being prior SD members or leaders. The members of the Einsatzgruppen— 500 men per Einsatzgruppe— were taken from local SS and police stations near the five units’ locations.
After the war, Bruno Streckenbach testified that Werner Best had directed deployment orders directly to him at the end of July or beginning of August. Streckenbach immediately left Hamburg to drive to Vienna, where he was deployed as head of Einsatzgruppe I. The German Wehrmacht invaded Poland on the morning of 1 September 1939. The Einsatzgruppen followed after them sending reports back to Berlin detailing the actions of Operation Tannenberg, the code name given to the anti-Polish extermination action carried out by the SD and SiPo in Poland during the opening weeks of the war. It was Streckenbach's task to oversee four districts as Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei im General Gouvernement: Warsaw, Krakow, Radom and Lublin. In each of these districts, thousands of Polish intellectuals—many former officers, professors, teachers, or politicians—were arrested and soon after, murdered. Streckenbach detailed the mission of the Einsatzgruppen: they were to seize and destroy all political and racial enemy groups, such as leftists, Roma, Polish resistance and Jews. In addition, they were to report on and evaluate material seized during the campaign and to gather information from agents among the Soviet population. Streckenbach ordered all enemies of the Third Reich to be deported to concentration camps and there to be executed. Jews were especially singled out for Sonderbehandlung ("special treatment"), a process that entailed particularly brutal beatings. On 9 November 1941 he was promoted to SS-Gruppenführer und Generalleutnant der Polizei.
By the end of 1939, the Einsatzgruppen were permanent units of the RSHA. Many members of the RSHA worked alongside the Einsatzgruppen in implementing brutal violence and mass murder throughout Poland. In May 1940, thousands of Poles were reported as liquidated. At the end of this month, Streckenbach had reported that “sentencing by martial law” was completed, with over 8,500 persons–whether accused as being “career criminals” or summoned to “summary sentencing”–were either already executed or would be shortly.
During his time in Poland, he had earned a reputation as the ruthless chief, who fought with such determination and mercilessness to eradicate any, and all, Nazi opponents.
Historian Michael Wildt suggests a stark increase in the activation of Streckenbach's radicalness from his time as a Gestapo chief in Hamburg to his first few months as the head of Einsatzgruppe I in Poland. Wildt notes the difference in responsibilities, going from arrests, abuses, assaults and killings of prisoners to the mindset of extermination of large groups of people. More than just a racial justification, Wildt suggests that Streckenbach's first few months as head of Einsatzgruppe I escalated into a murderous ideology that was unconceivable before this position.
Most of the previous SD men who were now employed in the Einsatzgruppen hadn't inflicted such murderous activity on so many people up until this point. As Wildt suggests, the deployment in Poland for the Einsatzgruppen was a defining moment for how policing matters were to be handled. It was these men's “first experience as racist mass murderers”. The deportations to the General-Gouvernement came from the Reich as well as newly “Germanized” territories which Germany had taken from Poland, removed the local “opponents”–Jews, Poles, Roma, and “asocial persons”–and replaced with ethnic Germans. During the late months of 1939, a span of eight weeks consisted of the execution of over 60,000 people by the Nazi forces, including by the Einsatzgruppen. Hitler insisted that this “harsh ethnic battle” could only be defeated without any internal resistance or legal restrictions upon implementation. Furthermore, the RSHA was the appropriate department for this “ethnic battle."
At the beginning of 1941, the attack on Soviet Union was first discussed among leaders of the RSHA. In March 1941, Heydrich informed a small circle of leaders, including Streckenbach, about the offensive that was to take place. The Wehrmacht army would lead and the Einsatzgruppen would secure the area after Soviets had been defeated. Streckenbach volunteered his unit's but Heydrich decided differently.
Streckenbach had commissioned the Personnel and Administration Office Leaders, advising them to prepare for deployment. In May 1941, Streckenbach called on his long-time colleague Erwin Schulz to prepare his men in the Leadership School of the Security Police in Berlin-Charlottenberg for deployment after just having completed their training as Criminal Police inspectors. Streckenbach sent them to Pretzsch, where they were to assume leadership status of the Einsatzkommando. These young soldiers, many of them recent college graduates, came motivated to fight and impress authority. The Einsatzgruppen were divided and formed in Pretzsch in May 1941. Streckenbach, Müller and Heydrich had the most authority in dispersing directions of the Einsatzkommandos in Pretzsch leading up to the offensive on the Soviet Union. Furthermore, in Otto Ohlendorf's Nuremberg Trial, he testified that Bruno Streckenbach had communicated the “order for the Final Solution” to the Einsatzgruppen.
Himmler and Hitler's actions following the assassination attempt and death of Heydrich were particularly vengeful. Hitler stated in reference to the Czechs who killed Heydrich, whenever you “kill someone, what results is always worse.” Streckenbach was called to Prague following the 4 June death of Heydrich. Himmler deemed the situation dire, the head of the RSHA having been killed with such abruptness.
Despite considering many leaders to assume Heydrich's position, Himmler decided to lead the RSHA himself. While Himmler was the head of the RSHA, Streckenbach — along with each of the other RSHA office heads — had near-full autonomy in deciding the internal structure of their respective divisions. Himmler focused his efforts on ensuring that Western European Jews be sent to extermination camps as efficiently and completely as possible, allowing the office heads like Streckenbach to control how it was done.
At the end of July 1942, Himmler named Streckenbach his representative as the legal authority of the RSHA. This essentially gave the latter absolute authority in deciding disciplinary cases regarding members of the RSHA. After Streckenbach had served as RSHA chief for about six months, Himmler concluded that a successor had to be publicly named. Bruno Streckenbach's responsibilities and qualifications were highly regarded and far exceeded expectations, and for this reason he was largely considered the best candidate for the position. Historian Tuviah Friedmann speculated that Himmler saw Streckenbach in some regards as having far too much power in his hands, possibly even seeing him as professional competition. To this day however, it is still unknown why Streckenbach was not appointed for the position of head of the RSHA, and Ernst Kaltenbrunner was chosen instead.
Hitler and Himmler wanted to name Streckenbach as the Senior SS and Police Leader of the Alpenland in Salzburg, Austria. Extremely disappointed, nonetheless, Streckenbach declined and in a personal letter to Himmler, requested to be placed in a military position.
Streckenbach trained in Hilversum, Holland with an antitank unit (as an Untersturmführer) in the beginning of 1943, and quickly advanced through the ranks of the Waffen-SS, even for being a senior SS leader. He was a regiment and division leader of the 8th SS Cavalry Division Florian Geyer and went on to lead the 19th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS (2nd Latvian) in the offensive against the Soviet Union in 1944 as a general. On 10 May 1945, Streckenbach and his division were taken prisoner in the Courland Pocket by the Soviet army. He remained a Soviet prisoner of war until 9 October 1955, when he was sent back to Hamburg.
When Streckenbach returned to Hamburg, he was informed that he faced charges for actions he had taken as the city's Gestapo chief. He was accused of beating someone in the kidneys; however after further investigation, the state prosecutor could not obtain the appropriate documents which provided evidence of the charges.
During the Nuremberg Trials, Streckenbach's name was continuously mentioned in court papers, among which was a testimony from Otto Ohlendorf who, as mentioned before, identified Streckenbach as one who had directed the Einsatzgruppen towards implementation of the Final Solution. However, the Hamburg State Prosecutor's Office concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to prove that his actions conflicted with the extant governing laws of the National Socialist rule. It was the case that many inhumane acts taken by the former Nazi members; as Wildt says, the assumption that National Socialism was synonymous with the “German Dictatorship rendered indivisible” the murderous acts that the party had taken in eastern and southern Europe and the Soviet Union.
In 1957, state prosecutors in Germany began discovering the unfathomable atrocities and millions of deaths of Soviet Jews culminating in the Ulm Einsatzkommando trial. His case prompted the 1959 establishment of the Central Office of State Justice Administration for the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes (Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Aufklärung der nationalsozialistischen Gewaltverbrechen) in Ludwigsburg. In the early 1960s, the office discovered a document providing evidence of deployment orders to Criminal Police and Gestapo officers that incited murderous activity. The court ordered the resumption of the investigation of crimes committed by Bruno Streckenbach.
On 30 June 1973, a bill of indictment for the murder of at least a million people was brought. Streckenbach, who was suffering from serious heart disease at the time, claimed ineligibility notwithstanding the strains a trial might place on his health. On 20 September 1974, the Hanseatic Appellate Court confirmed a diagnosis postponing trial commencement indefinitely. Bruno Streckenbach never had to answer for his part in the Nazi regime. He died on 28 October 1977 in Hamburg, Germany.
Chief of the Reich Security Main Office and Deputy Protector in Bohemia and Moravia SS-Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich (centre) in conversation with SS-Gruppenführer Bruno Streckenbach (right) at the inauguration of the Reich School of the Security Police and Security Service (RSSPSD) in Prague on April 16, 1942; far left is SS-Oberführer Erwin Schulz (1900–1981).
Source :
Bundesarchiv photo collection
https://de.metapedia.org/wiki/Streckenbach,_Bruno
https://www.holocausthistoricalsociety.org.uk/contents/germanbiographies/brunostreckenbach.html
https://www.tracesofwar.com/persons/14001/Streckenbach-Bruno.htm
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