Bio of SS-Brigadeführer Hinrich Schuldt (1901-1944)

Rudolf Hinrich Schuldt

Date of Birth: 14.06.1901 - Blankenese, Hamburg (German Empire)
Date of Death: 15.03.1944 - Ostrov, Pskov Oblast (Soviet Union)
Burial: 1 Meza kapi, Riga (Latvia)

Battles and Operations: Polenfeldzug 1939, Westfeldzug 1940, Ostfront 1941-1944 (including SS-Totenkopf units in Russia, Don-Front near Stalingrad, actions at Meschkoff, breakout near Nowo-Jerochin, defense at Woroschilow and Shiroky, counterattacks at Nikitowka-Bachtewitsch, Peipus Lake, Ilmen Lake, Wolchow bridgehead, flank attacks at Podbereshje)

NSDAP-Nr.: 975 664 (Joined 01.02.1932)
SS-Nr.: 242 677 (Joined 12.12.1933)

Parents: Rudolf Schuldt and Meta Hinrichsen

Promotions:
01.04.1922 Offiziersanwärter
00.09.1922 Seekadett
01.04.1924 Fähnrich zur See
00.04.1926 Oberfähnrich zur See
00.10.1926 Leutnant zur See
12.12.1933 SS-Sturmführer
10.01.1935 SS-Obersturmführer (with RDA from 01.01.1935)
08.03.1935 SS-Hauptsturmführer (with RDA from 10.03.1935)
09.11.1938 SS-Sturmbannführer
01.09.1941 SS-Obersturmbannführer der Waffen-SS
01.08.1942 SS-Standartenführer der Waffen-SS
24.12.1943 SS-Oberführer der Waffen-SS (with RDA from 09.11.1943)
25.03.1944 SS-Brigadeführer und Generalmajor der Waffen-SS (posthumously)

Career:
01.04.1922 joined the Reichsmarine (Crew 22) as Offiziersanwärter
00.04.1922 - 00.09.1922 basic training as a Seekadett at the 2. Korporalschaft in Kiel-Holtenau
00.10.1922 - 00.03.1924 on-board training at the ships Braunschweig, Niobe and Berlin
00.01.1928 left the Reichsmarine after a racist remark
00.00.1929 - 00.12.1933 maritime and military teacher at the Hanseatic Yacht School in Sierksdorf
12.12.1933 - 00.01.1934 Zugführer in SS-Standarte "Adolf Hitler"
00.00.1934 - 00.06.1934 serving in the Marinestürme der SA
11.06.1934 - 00.10.1934 Zugführer in Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler"
00.10.1934 - 00.11.1938 Führer 3.Sturm / I.Sturmbann / LSSAH
00.10.1938 took part in the annexation of the Sudetenland
01.11.1938 - 00.06.1939 Stabsoffizier I.Sturmbann / SS-Standarte "Germania" in Hamburg
00.06.1939 - 00.09.1939 Kommandeur I.Sturmbann / SS-Standarte "Deutschland"
00.09.1939 Kommandeur Kampfgruppe "Schuldt" / SS-Standarte "Deutschland"
00.09.1939 - 00.12.1939 reassigned to SS-Regiment "Germania"
01.01.1940 - 31.03.1940 Kommandeur Polizei-Aufklärungs-Abteilung
01.04.1940 - 30.04.1940 Stabsoffizier 4. SS-Totenkopfstandarte "Ostmark"
30.04.1940 Kommandeur I.Bataillon / 4.SS-Totenkopfstandarte "Ostmark"
15.07.1941 Kommandeur I.Bataillon / SS-Infanterie-Regiment 5
13.09.1941 - 20.04.1942 Kommandeur SS-Infanterie-Regiment 4
20.04.1942 - 01.12.1942 Kommandeur SS-Schnelle-Schützen-Regiment "Langemarck"
21.12.1942 - 15.03.1943 Kommandeur SS-Brigade "Schuldt" / Kampfgruppe "Schuldt"
23.02.1943 wounded by shrapnel in Nikitowka-Bakhtevich area
26.02.1943 wounded again by shrapnel in Nikitowka-Bakhtevich area
00.03.1943 - 30.06.1943 taken to the SS hospital in Berlin-Lichterfelde for his wounds
01.09.1943 - 15.03.1944 Kommandeur 2. Lettische SS-Freiwilligen-Brigade
15.03.1944 fatally hit by a direct anti-tank hit near the village of Petschane

Awards and Decorations:
00.02.1934 Ehrenwinkel für alte Kämpfer
16.12.1935 Julleuchter der SS
00.00.193_ Totenkopfring der SS
00.00.1937 Deutsches Olympia-Ehrenzeichen II.Klasse
01.12.1937 Ehrendegen des Reichsführers-SS
01.12.1937 SA-Sportabzeichen in Bronze
01.12.1937 Deutsches Reichssportabzeichen in Bronze
00.00.193_ Abzeichen der Deutschen Lebensrettungsgesellschaft (DLRG) in Bronze
00.00.193_ Lebensrettungsmedaille in Silber
00.00.193_ SA-Sportabzeichen in Gold
00.00.19__ SS-Dienstauszeichnungen
24.10.1939 Eisernes Kreuz II.Klasse
00.10.1941 Eisernes Kreuz I.Klasse
00.00.194_ Dienstauszeichnung der NSDAP in Bronze
00.00.194_ Infanterie-Sturmabzeichen in Silber
00.00.194_ Verwundetenabzeichen in Silber
00.00.1942 Medaille “Winterschlacht im Osten 1941/42” (Ostmedaille)
05.04.1942 Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes #949, as SS-Obersturmbannführer and Kommandeur SS-Infanterie-Regiment 4 "Reichsführer-SS". Awarded the or the following actions: 1) The rapid seizure of a vital piece of high ground near Schopina. This objective had been suggested by XXXXIII. Armee-Korps, but not ordered due to Schuldt's own weak forces. He nonetheless recognized a favourable situation and was able to capture the place even so. In doing this he created a flank guard for the Army, which forced the enemy to delay his encirclement of the Kaluga position for several days. 2) Creating the preconditions for the closure of the gap that had formed north of 4. Panzerarmee, and later covering the flank of the unit (17. Infanterie-Division) that was assigned for carrying out this task. The closure of this gap proved to be of vital importance to the whole Heeresgruppe.
02.04.1943 Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes mit Eichenlaub #220, as SS-Standartenführer and Kommandeur SS-Brigade Schuldt. Schuldt’s Eichenlaub recommendation reads as follows: "On 19.12.1942 SS-Standartenführer Schuldt with three Leibstandarte Kompanies and one-and-a-half Kompanies from the SS-Polizei Division were moving in the billeting area assigned by the XXIX. Armeekorps in Meschkoff. On the way they met the Italians from Armeeoberkommando 8 falling back and rushing in disorder, closely pursued by the Russians. In a quick and bold resolution. SS-Standartenführer Schuldt switched over from the march to counter attack and took the high ground east and north east of Meschkoff that dominated the entire area. The Russians were thrown back in the whole area and the high ground held. Then a report about the failure of the Italian defensive front was sent to the XXIX. Armeekorps (this was the first report that the German Command received about the collapse of the Italian Front). Schuldt displayed a clear and widespread knowledge of the tactical situation. Due to the resolute and energetic leadership of the commander and the bravery of his SS men, the majority of the Italian troops could be saved from being completely annihilated. Under the personal leadership of Schuldt, the positions in Meschkoff were held against strong enemy infantry and tank attacks. Meanwhile two Russian Tank Corps broke through the left flanking unit towards the west and in the course of the following day completely encircled the XXIX. Armeekorps. The entire XXIX. Armeekorps staff with the Korps commander, straggling German troops and Italian units in disorder all found themselves in the cauldron. They were harassed by the tanks of the attacking opponent from all sides. The only significant combat power at hand was in the elements of SS-Kampfgruppe Schuldt . Again it must be credited to the energetic and precise leadership of the Brigade commander that, after hard fighting, the breakout of the Armeekorps to reach the lines of Heeresgruppe Don on 29.12.1942 could be successful. On 15.01.1943, in spite of the strongest defense, parts of the SS-Brigade 'Schuldt' were surrounded at the bridgehead and blocking positions near Nowo-Jerochin and Klitwenezkaja. The order of the XXX. Armeekorps to disengage and fall back to Kamensk did not reach the Kampfgruppe because the radio station was destroyed by a direct hit. In that moment, when the position in Nowo-Jerochin was almost completely surrounded by 15 Russian tanks, the vigorous leadership of SS-Standartenführer Schuldt was proven again. He ordered that all the forces engaged in Nowo-Jerochin should break out towards Kamensk. Schuldt, with a small group of SS men and officers attracted the attention of the enemy to facilitate the escape of our troops. The next morning the commander with one officer and five men finally reached Kamensk, after having gone through the Russian formations already deployed in front of Kamensk. In the night from 31.01. to 01.02.1943 the enemy attacked SS-Brigade 'Schuldt' by surprise with strong forces reinforced with tanks. The area became our defensive front over the Donez. In an extremely hard and bloody fight the positions in Woroschilow and Shiroky were held for two days and two nights. They thwarted a complete breakthrough of the opponent that severely hit the Brigade's defensive positions, which had the end goal of reaching Krassnodon. This success must be credited to the energetic and lively leadership of the commander and his personal performance. After the withdrawal of the defensive front to the Wodjanoj position, it was only thanks to the compelling personality of the commander, often by force, that the newly attached elements of the 304th Infantry Division held back the enemy. He forced them to build up their positions so that the massive attacks of the opponent were resisted until the order to withdraw was given. The opponent recognized the Brigade's hard defensive willpower and, with the support of tank forces, tried repeatedly to force a breakthrough either by the right or the left flank. That put the Brigade in extreme danger and in a serious situation. Only through the bravery of the Brigade and attached units under the energetic and prudent leadership of its' commander could the situation be stabilized. In this period. the Brigade destroyed 24 tanks and three armoured attack airplanes of the enemy. To finish off a local enemy break-in to the west of the Olchowaja sector, SS-Brigade 'Schuldt' was transferred on 22.02.1943 into the area of Nikitowka-Bachtewitsch. On 23.02, after moving into the assembly position, they attacked the opponent in Wassjukowa-Schl. with an assault group under the command of the SS-Sturmbannführer Dietrich. They had the objective of enabling the recapture of the main fighting line by Gruppe 'Hunten'. With the attack progressing, the battle developed more and more into close combat by assault detachments at short range. After a hard fight under the personal leadership of the Brigade commander, who in the course of the battle was wounded by a shell splinter above the right eye, the old main fighting line could be reached and occupied. In the meantime, on 24.02.1943, the Russians managed to penetrate the left flank of Gruppe 'Hunten' with strong forces. At that moment, when the whole defensive front in the right sector of Gruppe 'Kreysing' threatened to collapse, this sector was subordinated to SS-Brigade 'Schuldt' with the following words of General Kreysing, "Herr Schuldt, you must do it, I rely on you." The commander of the Brigade, SS-Standartenführer Schuldt, recognized quickly that hills 287.4 and 227.4 were essential for the defense and also as a rallying point for any counterattack. They had to be held at any price. Schuldt's energy, which he stressed to the officers subordinated to him and at the same time was passed along to all of the fighting troops, must be thanked. The heights were again snatched away from the opponent in a surprise counterthrust, and with this the impending breakthrough could be halted as well. After a very hard initial battle, on 26.02.1943, a counterattack (again under the personal leadership of the commander) destroyed the massive enemy forces in the Ssereschina-Schl. in two-and-a-half hours. The day's objective and with it the old main fighting line were reached. During the attack the Commander was wounded for the second time by mortar splinters in the shoulder and back. After that time the assignment of the Kampfgruppe was fulfilled and the disengagement of the Brigade began."
21.04.1943 Deutsches Kreuz in Gold
29.02.1944 Mentioned in Wehrmachtbericht
25.03.1944 Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes mit Eichenlaub und Schwertern #56 (posthumously), as SS-Oberfuhrer and Kommandeur 2. "lettische" SS-Freiwilligen-Brigade. Schuldt’s Schwerter recommendation reads as follows: "Oakleaves holder SS-Oberführer Schuldt has activated and trained the 2. Latvian Volunteer Brigade in the Wolchow bridgehead under the most difficult conditions. The fact he managed to build a combat unit capable of the highest performance in mobile warfare from mostly untrained Latvian volunteers in a dangerous, swampy land in only a few months is due to his organizational talent, high military knowledge and unequalled energy. The brigade is result of his work. In mid-January the Russians, with far superior forces, forced back the right adjacent division. The break-in from Podbereshje threatened to widen to a full break-through. SS-Oberführer Schuldt, recognizing clearly the extreme seriousness of the situation, decided to hit the enemy—which was moving west—with a severe blow in the flank. He inflicted heavy losses on the Russian assault divisions and gained at least forty-eight hours of decisive significance for the battle command of the Korps and for the operations of the Army. The road Kampfgruppe Schuldt kept open allowed an Armeekorps with five subordinate divisions to pull back. To achieve the highest possible concentration of forces for the active defense, SS-Oberführer Schuldt removed men from his line not attacked initially by Spaskaja Powistj so that in every Kompanie sector one NCO and two to four men simulated a complete garrison through noise and movement. This was done although the idea of a strong enemy thrust against this sector seemed completely possible. He gave the order for the retreat of his southern wing that was threatened in the deep flank. This was done only after he accomplished, with the minimal forces available and great difficulty, the recovery of the last stationary positioned weapons. When the advance of the newly committed Russian divisions on the road Raglizy-Sselo-Gorka towards the west was no ionger preventable with diminishing forces, SS-Oberführer Schuldt proposed letting himself become encircled with his Kampfgruppe. He wanted to cause the highest possible damage to the enemy, who was attacking from all sides, and then break through. That this decisive success could be achieved—and Kampfgruppe Schuldt in the ensuing bitter and heavy retreat battles with its left flank almost always open against strong Partisan troops in the rear was successful—is due to SS-Oberführer Schuldt. He reached his objective in strict order and must be thanked. Besides the bravery and hardness of the Latvian volunteers, Schuldt's outstanding personal bravery, power of decision, superior calmness, and almost unique energy is to be credited. SS-Oberführer Schuldt, who was killed on 15.03.1944 amongst his grenadiers, whose name far beyond his unit has served as a standard for the success of even the heaviest and seemingly meaningless undertakings, is considered especially worthy of being awarded the Swords to the Oakleaves of the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross."

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Hinrich Schuldt was the son of the HAPAG captain and later ship owner Rudolf Schuldt and his wife Meta née Hinrichsen. At the age of 21, Hinrich Schuldt joined the Reichsmarine on April 1, 1922 (crew 22) as an officer cadet. The sea cadet completed his basic training from April to September 1922 at the 2nd corporal body in Kiel-Holtenau. He completed the subsequent practical on-board training from October 1922 to the end of March 1924 on the ships Braunschweig, Niobe and Berlin. On board these ships, Schuldt traveled to Italy, Portugal, Spain and France. During this time, Schuld earned his private pilot's license. On April 1, 1924 he was promoted to ensign at sea. In April 1926 he was promoted to Oberfähnrich zur See and in October of the same year he was promoted to Leutnant zur See. In January 1928, Schuldt left the Reichsmarine after a racist remark. The background to this was his statement to a Jewish member of the Imperial Navy that non-Aryans were in principle not fit to be soldiers.
From 1929 to December 1933 he worked as a maritime and military teacher at the Hanseatic Yacht School in Sierksdorf. During this time, Schuldt joined the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) in December 1931, which confirmed his admission on February 1, 1932 with membership number 975,664. On the same day he also joined the SA as an SA man. With effect from December 12, 1933, Schuldt changed to the rank of SS-Sturmfuhrer for the SS-Standard "Adolf Hitler", but without officially switching to the SS. He then acted as a platoon commander in this SS standard until January 1934. After that he was again in the service of the SA. later he was a training officer in the inspection of the SA naval storms under the SA Untersturmfuhrer and later NSFK Obergruppenfuhrer Alfred Krüger.

On April 25, 1934, Schuldt asked the Reichsfuhrer SS Heinrich Himmler to be accepted into the SS. At the same time, he turned his old crewmate Heydrich on to the matter. On June 11, 1934, Schuldt's wish was granted and he joined the Leibstandarte SS “Adolf Hitler” as an SS man. After that, Schuldt was a platoon commander in the renamed Leibstandarte-SS “Adolf Hitler” until October 1934. After that he was until November 1938 leader of the 3rd storm in the local I. Sturmbann. During this time he was promoted to SS Obersturmfuhrer on January 10, 1935 and to SS Hauptsturmfuhrer in March 1935. In October 1938, Schuldt took part in the annexation of the Sudetenland, where he had an accident with a car and sustained injuries that led to a three-week hospital stay in Plauen, later he had to undergo two more operations. On November 1, 1938, he was posted to the SS Standard "Germania" in Hamburg, where Schuldt was employed on the staff of the I. Sturmbann. There he was promoted to SS-Sturmbannfuhrer on November 9 of the same year. In June 1939 he was transferred to the SS-Standard "Deutschland" in Munich, where he was employed as a battalion commander.

At the beginning of the Second World War, Schuldt was the leader of the "Kampfgruppe Schuldt" named after him in the SS-Standard "Deutschland", which took part in the Polish campaign as part of the Panzer Division Kempf. After the end of the fighting in Poland, Schuldt was assigned to the SS regiment "Germania", where he was in charge of all regiment units. In mid-December 1939, Schuldt was assigned to the police reconnaissance department, which he headed from January 1 to the end of March 1940. He was then transferred to the staff of the 4th SS Totenkopfstandarte "Ostmark" and from April 30, 1940 battalion commander of the 1st Battalion. He took part in the western campaign and was transferred to the SS Infantry Regiment 5 on July 15, 1941, after the start of the Russian campaign, where he took over the leadership of the 1st Battalion. On September 1, 1941, he was promoted to SS Obersturmfuhrer. From September 13 to April 20, 1942 he led the SS Infantry Regiment 4 in the northern section of the Eastern Front. On April 20, 1942, his regiment received the honorary title of Langemarck for its combat merits and was renamed the SS Regiment "Langemarck", which Schuldt continued to command until December 1, 1942, since August 7 SS Standartenfuhrer. By this time the regiment had been transferred to France for refresher training, where Schuldt said goodbye to his regiment in Tessy in November 1942.

On December 1, 1942, Schuldt became leader of the Kampfgruppe Schuldt named after him on the Don Front. His combat group was a mixture of various units of the Waffen SS, including parts of the "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler", SS police units and other parts of the SS Panzer Grenadier Division "Das Reich". On February 23 and February 26, 1943, Schuldt was wounded twice by shrapnel in the Nikitowka-Bakhtevich area within a few days. For this reason, he was taken to the SS hospital in Berlin-Lichterfelde at the beginning of March 1943, and his group was withdrawn from combat operations the following day. On March 15, 1943, his combat group in Debica was disbanded. On May 11, 1943, Adolf Hitler presented him with the Oak Leaves for the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross on the Obersalzberg for his past services. Still in the recovery phase, Schuldt wrote on June 29, 1943 to SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Hans Jüttner, requesting that he be transferred to a new front-line operation. Thereupon Reichsfuhrer SS Himmler determined that Schuldt had to take over the 2nd (Latvian) SS Volunteer Brigade of the Latvian SS units after his health had been restored. After Schuldt was released from the hospital in the same month, he was given command of the brigade intended for him with effect from September 1, 1943. On September 5, 1943, he assumed command and on November 9, 1943, Schuldt was promoted to SS Oberfuhrer. The combat area of his unit was in the Peipussee and Ilmensee area and in the Volkhov bridgehead on the northern section of the eastern front. The Brigade Schuldts was renamed twice more in the course of its existence. Once in the 2nd Latvian SS Volunteer Brigade and on 7 January 1944 in the 19th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS (Latvian No. 2). From January 1944, the division was subordinate to the XXXVIII. Panzer Corps. On March 15, 1944, Schuldt was fatally hit by a direct anti-tank hit near the village of Petschane. His burial took place in Riga in the local Forest Cemetery II at the Riga Cathedral. On March 16, 1944, Schuldt was posthumously promoted to SS-Brigadefuhrer and nominated by General of the XXXVIII Army Corps Herzog for the award of the Swords to Oak Leaves, which he was awarded on March 25, 1944. On June 1, 1944, Hitler provided Schuldt's mother with a monthly allowance of 150 Reichsmarks, and on January 15, 1945, the 43rd Waffen Grenadier Regiment of the SS (Lat. No. 2) received the honorific "Hinrich Schuldt".

SS-Hauptsturmführer Hinrich Schuldt. In the background is Lichterfelde Barracks courtyard.

From left to right: SS-Obersturmführer Franz Lang and SS-Hauptsturmführer Hinrich Schuldt. This photo was taken during the closing of platoon commander course for the cadets of the Junkerschulen Tölz and Braunschweig in Dachau (Übungslager) during February and March 1937. Chef 1. Sturm (company) was SS-Hstuf. Schuldt, while Chef 2. Sturm was SS-Ostuf. Lang. Hinrich Schuld would receive the Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes mit Eichenlaub und Schwertern with the last rank as SS-Brigadeführer, both posthumously after his death (15 March 1944).



Hinrich Schuldt (front) marching with his men.

Hinrich Schuldt with his men. No information about date or place.

The first months of the German occupation in the Netherlands (May to November 1940). Transfer from I.Bataillon / 4.SS-Totenkopfstandarte "Ostmark" to the National Commissioner for DOO RDE occupied Dutch areas, Reichsminister Dr. Seyss-Inquart. The Bataillonskommandeur is SS-Sturmbannführer Hinrich Schuldt (in the picture). The picture was taken on 19 June 1940. The video from this sequence can be seen HERE.

From left to right: SS-Sturmbannführer Jakob "Jopp" Fick (Kommandeur I.Bataillon [Kradschützen] / SS-Schnelle-Schützen-Regiment “Langemarck”. Ritterkreuz on 23 April 1943), unknown SS-Obersturmführer from Totenkopf, and SS-Obersturmbannführer Hinrich Schuldt (Kommandeur SS-Schnelle-Schützen-Regiment “Langemarck”. Ritterkreuz on 5 April 1942, Eichenlaub on 2 April 1943, and Schwerter posthumously on 25 March 1944).



SS-Standartenführer Hinrich Schuldt with the Ritterkreuz.



SS-Standartenführer Hinrich Schuldt with the Eichenlaub.



SS-Standartenführer Hinrich Schuldt with the Eichenlaub.

Officers from SS-Panzergrenadier-Division "Das Reich" in the sportstreffen (sport festival) event of the unit, possibly in the autumn or winter of 1942. From left to right: SS-Hauptsturmführer Walter Kniep (Kommandeur SS-Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 2 "Das Reich". Ritterkreuz on 14 August 1943), SS-Sturmbannführer Jakob "Jopp" Fick (Kommandeur I.Bataillon [Kradschützen] / SS-Schnelle-Schützen-Regiment “Langemarck”. Ritterkreuz on 23 April 1943), and SS-Standartenführer Hinrich Schuldt (Kommandeur SS-Schnelle-Schützen-Regiment “Langemarck”. Ritterkreuz on 5 April 1942, Eichenlaub on 2 April 1943, and Schwerter posthumously on 25 March 1944).



SS-Standartenführer Hinrich Schuldt on the phone in a special train belong to Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler, July-August 1943. Smoking beside him is SS-Hauptsturmführer Rupert Dangl. Schuldt is wearing the Eichenlaub on his neck and "Langemarck" sleeve stripes. The picture was taken when the train stopped at Angerburg, East Prussia. Still in the recovery phase after his wounds in previous March, Schuldt wrote on 29 June 1943 to SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Hans Jüttner, requesting that he be transferred to a new front-line operation. Thereupon Reichsfuhrer SS Himmler determined that Schuldt had to take over the 2nd (Latvian) SS Volunteer Brigade of the Latvian SS units after his health had been restored. After Schuldt was released from the hospital in the same month, he was given command of the brigade intended for him with effect from September 1, 1943. Other pictures from the same sequence can be seen HERE.

SS-Oberführer Hinrich Schuldt.

Source :
Bayerische Staatsbibliothek photo archive
Hoffmann collection NARA photo archive
Denis Daum photo collection
Phil Nix photo collection
Sebastian Möller photo collection
Michael D. Miller archive
https://www.akg-images.de/archive/-2UMEBMBUOH9Y5.html
http://alifrafikkhan.blogspot.com/2010/09/daftar-ss-brigadefuhrer-pimpinan.html
https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/195965196/hinrich-schuldt
https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=38&t=120236&hilit=hinrich+schuldt
https://www.generalassaultmilitaria.com/product/ss-officer-kc-holder-press-photo-on-kodak-paper/
https://www.imago-images.de/st/0163960821
https://www.tracesofwar.com/persons/13926/Schuldt-Hinrich.htm

Ritterkreuz Actions of Bruno Streckenbach

Bruno Streckenbach (7 February 1902 - 28 October 1977) received the Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes on 27 August 1944 as SS-Brigadeführer und Generalmajor der Waffen-SS and Kommandeur 19. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (lettische Nr. 2). Streckenbach’s Ritterkreuz recommendation reads as follows: “On6 August 1944 the Kampfgruppe 19. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (Lett. Nr. 2) was engaged in combat behind the Aiviekste river (west of Lake Lubana), however it did not have friendly contact to either the left or right as a result of deep hostile penetrations. During the afternoon an attack by a Soviet Division from the north threatened to sever the single retirement road of the Division at a point northwest of Lubana. High command ordered that this penetration be sealed off. In this precarious situation SS-Brigadeführer Streckenbach made the decision to go over to the attack. He assembled all available reserves (including every last supply driver and clerk he could find) and then personally led a pincer maneuver against the broken-in hostile elements. Success: Total destruction of 2 Soviet rifle regiments, Division was able to pull back as ordered along the sole available route. SS-Brigadeführer had been the soul of resistance for his Division since the beginning of its prolonged withdrawal on 10 July 1944. Throughout this time he rushed from Kompanie to Kompanie in the foremost line, all while rallying wavering units and upholding the combat morale of his Latvian formations. The countermeasures that he executed during this period repeatedly led to notable successes. His proven personal bravery and leadership qualities make him a particularly worthy candidate for being awarded the Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes.”

Streckenbach received the Eichenlaub #701 for his Ritterkreuz on 16 January 1945 as SS-Gruppenführer und Generalleutnant der Waffen-SS and Kommandeur 19. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (lettische Nr. 2). “During the morning hours of 23 December 1944 the Russians conducted a short yet ferocious artillery barrage before launching a surprise multi-division assault against the left neighbouring Division (Gruppe Henze) as well as the left wing of the 19. Waffen-Grenadier-Division. Although the Division was able to repulse all attacks against it, the enemy was able to achieve a deep penetration in the sector of the left neighbouring Division. Within a short time the foe had overrun the second position, and then they pressed on to the Artillerie’s defensive screen. Enemy forces pivoted to the northwest, and by pushing on in this direction they threatened to cut off the left wing of the Division. This could easily have led to the disintegration of the frontline: the enemy would have achieved their deep penetration and thereby enabled their planned breakthrough to proceed. In this particularly critical moment SS-Gruppenführer Streckenbach decided to first order his Waffen-Gren.Rgt. 42 to form a blocking front. At the same time he planned to commit all available forces against the enemy’s main thrust in the left flank of his Division. These included the II./W.-Gren.Rgt. 43, the existing alarm units from the supply troops and the Kampfschule of the Feld-Ers.Btl. Although his right flank was also being attacked at several points he nonetheless pull additional elements from it in order to reinforce his left wing. This risky decision paid off however, as it held up the deep flank of his Division and ensured that the hostile thrust towards the northwest would be temporarily contained. However the enemy pressure against the deep flank of the 19. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS continued to increase throughout 24 December 1944, and so during the afternoon the divisional commander was assigned the II./Gren.Rgt. 273 of the 93. Infanterie-Division (which had been brought up via motor transport). On the morning of the next day he did not use it to seal off the new hostile penetrations, but rather he used it to deliberately counterattack the flank of this enemy thrust. This countermeasure again halted the enemy’s thrust to the northwest for the time being, and it also helped buttress the ever-lengthening deep flank of the Division. This initiative by the divisional commander was the deciding factor that enabled the extended frontline of the 19. Waffen-Gren.Div. der SS to be held for 4 days long despite strong enemy attacks in the front and flank. Such an action furthermore presented the enemy with a dangerous flank threat for their own thrust to the northwest. It was only on the night of the 26-27 December 1944 that the frontline of the 19. Waffen-Gren. Division der SS was pulled back to the Artillerie defensive position due to the situation in the sector of Gruppe Henze. The Korps’ ability to delay this breakthrough attempt by 6 divisions and 1 Soviet Tank Corps with its own weak forces bought enough time for armoured reinforcements to arrive from other sectors of the Courland front, and once they had arrived it was possible to transition to a more active form of combat. This outstanding achievement by the 19. Waffen-Gren.Div. der SS (which was notable enough to merit a mention in the Wehrmachtbericht) is largely attributable to the clear and energetic leadership of its commander. He personally directed the heavy forest combat of his Latvians from the vicinity of the regimental command posts, and everywhere he was the soul of the bitter resistance. Captured Russian officers stated that these combat days were some of the worst they had seen in the entire war. Up until now this Latvian Division has held its ground in an exemplary fashion whilst engaged in defensive combat. It shows clear evidence of having been influenced by the personality of its commander. The high combat value of his unit can be credited to the decisiveness, energetic leadership and personal devotion to duty displayed by the divisional commander, SS-Gruppenführer Streckenbach. In these 9 major days of combat the Russians suffered heavy losses in men at the hands of the 19. Waffen-Gren.Div. der SS. They also sustained the following materiel losses to the Division in this time: 1 aircraft (to infantry weapons), 18 tanks (including 8 to close combat weapons), 1 assault gun, 18 anti-tank guns, 12 trucks, 26 medium and heavy mortars, 44 heavy machine-guns, 156 light machine-guns, and numerous additional war materiel. 104 prisoners were also captured (including 4 deserters). In these days of bitter forest combat along a wide front, the Division inflicted such heavy losses on 3 attacking Russian divisions that the enemy was forced to call off their assault on 1 January 1945. The defensive resolve of this Division laid the groundwork for the crushing defeat sustained by the Russian 22nd Army during the first days of January.”

Source :
https://www.holocausthistoricalsociety.org.uk/contents/germanbiographies/brunostreckenbach.html
https://www.tracesofwar.com/persons/14001/Streckenbach-Bruno.htm

Bio of SS-Gruppenführer Bruno Streckenbach (1902-1977)

Bruno Streckenbach

Date of Birth: 07.02.1902 - Hamburg (German Empire)
Date of Death: 28.10.1977 - Hamburg (West Germany)

NSDAP Number: unknown (joined 01.10.1930)
SS Number: unknown (joined 01.09.1931)
Parents: Hans Heinrich Hugo Streckenbach (30 August 1869) and Minna Johanna Elisabeth Spenner (4 May 1877)
Wife: Klara Luise Wulff (divorced 11.07.1926); Helene Karolina Amanda Steinhard (married 20.10.1927 and divorced 11.06.1934; Franziska Konradone Dore Hartjen (married 15.07.1937)
Children: A son and a daughter (from third marriage)

Promotions:
24.12.1932 SS-Sturmführer
12.06.1933 SS-Hauptsturmführer
02.09.1933 SS-Sturmbannführer
09.11.1933 SS-Obersturmbannführer
20.04.1934 SS-Standartenführer
00.00.1935 Feldwebel der Reserve
12.09.1936 SS-Oberführer
20.04.1939 SS-Brigadeführer
01.01.1941 SS-Brigadeführer und Generalmajor der Polizei
09.11.1941 SS-Gruppenführer und Generalleutnant der Polizei
18.01.1943 SS-Untersturmführer der Reserve der Waffen-SS
01.03.1943 SS-Obersturmführer der Reserve der Waffen-SS
10.03.1943 SS-Hauptsturmführer der Reserve der Waffen-SS
11.03.1943 SS-Sturmbannführer der Reserve der Waffen-SS
01.07.1943 SS-Obersturmbannführer der Reserve der Waffen-SS
28.08.1943 SS-Standartenführer der Reserve der Waffen-SS
30.01.1944 SS-Oberführer der Reserve der Waffen-SS
01.07.1944 SS-Brigadeführer der Reserve und Generalmajor der Reserve der Waffen-SS
09.11.1944 SS-Gruppenführer der Reserve und Generalleutnant der Reserve der Waffen-SS

Career:
00.00.190_ Volksschule
00.00.1908 Realgymnasium des Hamburger Johanneums
00.10.1918 Unterprimaner Jungmann-Etappen-Kommando
00.02.1919 Oberprimaner Freikorps Hermann
00.00.19__ Freiwilligen Wachtabteilung Bahrenfeld
00.00.19__ Norddeutschen Heimatbund
00.00.19__ Wehrwolf
00.00.19__ Fremdsprachenkorrespondent
00.00.1925 Gaugeschäftsführer ADAC in Hamburg
00.00.1928 Verkäufer Stöver-Werken
01.10.1930 Member of NSDAP
00.12.1930 Member of SA
01.09.1931 Member of SS
00.00.193_ - 00.00.1932 Autovermietung "Selbstfahrer-Union"
00.00.1932 Werbevertreter Automobilbranche
00.12.1932 Führer Sturmbann I / 28. SS-Standarte
00.00.1933 Werbeabteilung Norddeutschen Rundfunk
20.10.1933 Leiter der politischen Polizei Hamburg
00.00.193_ Leiter Zeitfunkabteilung Norddeutschen Rundfunk
00.00.193_ Polizeidirektion München
05.10.1933 Regierungsrat
01.02.1938 Regierungsdirektor / Inspekteur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (IdS), Wehrkreis X
00.09.1939 Führer Einsatzgruppe 1 / 14.Armee
01.11.1939 Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (BdS), Krakau
12.06.1940 Chef Amt I (Organisation, Verwaltung und Recht) in Reichssicherheitshauptamtes (RSHA)
11.07.1942 Stellvertretender Gerichtsherr des RSHA
00.12.1942 Entered Waffen-SS
15.01.1943 Panzerjäger-Ersatz-Abteilung, Hilversum
15.03.1943 Führer Panzerjäger-Abteilung 8 / SS-Kavallerie-Division "Florian Geyer"
00.00.194_ Panzertruppschule Wunsdorf
10.01.1944 Kommandeur 8. SS-Kavallerie-Division "Florian Geyer"
01.04.1944 Führer 19. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS "Latvia" (lettische Nr. 2)
10.05.1945 POW Soviet forces
18.02.1954 Convicted to 25 years forced labour, Mosow Military Tribune
00.00.195_ Wladimir Prison
10.10.1955 Released
00.00.19__ - 30.06.1969 kaufmännischer Angestellter und Prokurist, Ottenser Eisenwerk GmbH

Awards and Decorations:
00.00.1924 Meisterschaftsabzeichen des Deutschen Ruderverbandes
00.00.193_ SS-Totenkopfring
00.00.193_ Ehrendegen des Reichsführers-SS
16.12.1935 Julleuchter der SS
00.00.193_ SA-Sportabzeichen in Bronze
24.08.1938 Magyar Érdemkereszt (Hungarian Order of Merit)
30.01.1939 Goldenes Parteiabzeichen der NSDAP
00.00.19__ Dienstauszeichnungen der NSDAP in Bronze und Silber
00.00.19__ SS-Dienstauszeichnungen, 3. und 2. Stufe (12 Jahre)
00.09.1939 Eisernes Kreuz II.Klasse
30.01.1942 Kriegsverdienstkreuz II.Klasse mit Schwertern
30.01.1942 Kriegsverdienstkreuz I.Klasse mit Schwertern
15.07.1943 Eisernes Kreuz I.Klasse
06.09.1943 Tapferkeitsauszeichnung für Angehörige der Ostvölker I.Klasse in Silber
25.09.1943 Allgemeines-Sturmabzeichen
30.10.1943 Nahkampfspange in Bronze
15.12.1943 Deutsches Kreuz in Gold
09.08.1944 Mentioned in the Wehrmachtbericht: "Im Nordabschnitt der Ostfront haben sich die norddeutsche 83. Infanteriedivision unter Oberst Götz mit unterstellten Teilen der ostpreußischen 61. Infanteriedivision und die 19. lettische SS-Division unter Führung von SS-Brigadeführer und Generalmajor der Waffen-SS Streckenbach in Angriff und Abwehr besonders bewährt." (In the northern section of the Eastern Front, the North German 83rd Infantry Division under Colonel Götz with subordinate parts of the East Prussian 61st Infantry Division and the 19th Latvian SS Division under the leadership of SS Brigadefuhrer and Major General of the Waffen-SS Streckenbach have proven themselves in attack and defense).
27.08.1944 Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes, as SS-Brigadeführer und Generalmajor der Waffen-SS and Kommandeur 19. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (lettische Nr. 2). Streckenbach’s Ritterkreuz recommendation reads as follows: “On the 06.08.1944 the Kampfgruppe 19. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (Lett. Nr. 2) was engaged in combat behind the Aiviekste river (west of Lake Lubana), however it did not have friendly contact to either the left or right as a result of deep hostile penetrations. During the afternoon an attack by a Soviet Division from the north threatened to sever the single retirement road of the Division at a point northwest of Lubana. High command ordered that this penetration be sealed off. In this precarious situation SS-Brigadeführer Streckenbach made the decision to go over to the attack. He assembled all available reserves (including every last supply driver and clerk he could find) and then personally led a pincer maneuver against the broken-in hostile elements. Success: Total destruction of 2 Soviet rifle regiments, Division was able to pull back as ordered along the sole available route. SS-Brigadeführer had been the soul of resistance for his Division since the beginning of its prolonged withdrawal on the 10.07.1944. Throughout this time he rushed from Kompanie to Kompanie in the foremost line, all while rallying wavering units and upholding the combat morale of his Latvian formations. The countermeasures that he executed during this period repeatedly led to notable successes. His proven personal bravery and leadership qualities make him a particularly worthy candidate for being awarded the Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes.”
30.09.1944 Mentioned in the Wehrmachtbericht: "In der Abwehrschlacht in Lettland hat sich die 19. Waffengenadierdivision der SS (lettische Nr. 2) unter Führung von SS-Brigadeführer und Generalmajor der Waffen-SS Streckenbach bei der Verteidigung ihres Heimatbodens hervorragend geschlagen." (In the defensive battle in Latvia, the 19th Waffen Genadier Division of the SS (Latvian No. 2) under the leadership of SS Brigadefuehrer and Major General of the Waffen-SS Streckenbach did an excellent job in defending their homeland).
27.12.1944 Mentioned in the Wehrmachtbericht: "Bei den schweren Abwehrkämpfen in Kurland haben sich die 205. Infanteriedivision unter Führung des Generalleutnants von Mellenthin und die 19. Freiwilligendivision unter SS-Gruppenführer und Generalleutnant der Waffen-SS Streckenbach hervorragend geschlagen." (During the heavy defensive fighting in Kurland, the 205th Infantry Division under the command of Lieutenant General von Mellenthin and the 19th Volunteer Division under SS Group Leader and Lieutenant General of the Waffen-SS Streckenbach did extremely well).
16.01.1945 Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes mit Eichenlaub #701, as SS-Gruppenführer und Generalleutnant der Waffen-SS and Kommandeur 19. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (lettische Nr. 2). “During the morning hours of the 23.12.1944 the Russians conducted a short yet ferocious artillery barrage before launching a surprise multi-division assault against the left neighbouring Division (Gruppe Henze) as well as the left wing of the 19. Waffen-Grenadier-Division. Although the Division was able to repulse all attacks against it, the enemy was able to achieve a deep penetration in the sector of the left neighbouring Division. Within a short time the foe had overrun the second position, and then they pressed on to the Artillerie’s defensive screen. Enemy forces pivoted to the northwest, and by pushing on in this direction they threatened to cut off the left wing of the Division. This could easily have led to the disintegration of the frontline: the enemy would have achieved their deep penetration and thereby enabled their planned breakthrough to proceed. In this particularly critical moment SS-Gruppenführer Streckenbach decided to first order his Waffen-Gren.Rgt. 42 to form a blocking front. At the same time he planned to commit all available forces against the enemy’s main thrust in the left flank of his Division. These included the II./W.-Gren.Rgt. 43, the existing alarm units from the supply troops and the Kampfschule of the Feld-Ers.Btl. Although his right flank was also being attacked at several points he nonetheless pull additional elements from it in order to reinforce his left wing. This risky decision paid off however, as it held up the deep flank of his Division and ensured that the hostile thrust towards the northwest would be temporarily contained. However the enemy pressure against the deep flank of the 19. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS continued to increase throughout the 24.12.1944, and so during the afternoon the divisional commander was assigned the II./Gren.Rgt. 273 of the 93. Infanterie-Division (which had been brought up via motor transport). On the morning of the next day he did not use it to seal off the new hostile penetrations, but rather he used it to deliberately counterattack the flank of this enemy thrust. This countermeasure again halted the enemy’s thrust to the northwest for the time being, and it also helped buttress the ever-lengthening deep flank of the Division. This initiative by the divisional commander was the deciding factor that enabled the extended frontline of the 19. Waffen-Gren.Div. der SS to be held for 4 days long despite strong enemy attacks in the front and flank. Such an action furthermore presented the enemy with a dangerous flank threat for their own thrust to the northwest. It was only on the night of the 26./27.12.1944 that the frontline of the 19. Waffen-Gren. Division der SS was pulled back to the Artillerie defensive position due to the situation in the sector of Gruppe Henze. The Korps’ ability to delay this breakthrough attempt by 6 divisions and 1 Soviet Tank Corps with its own weak forces bought enough time for armoured reinforcements to arrive from other sectors of the Courland front, and once they had arrived it was possible to transition to a more active form of combat. This outstanding achievement by the 19. Waffen-Gren.Div. der SS (which was notable enough to merit a mention in the Wehrmachtbericht) is largely attributable to the clear and energetic leadership of its commander. He personally directed the heavy forest combat of his Latvians from the vicinity of the regimental command posts, and everywhere he was the soul of the bitter resistance. Captured Russian officers stated that these combat days were some of the worst they had seen in the entire war. Up until now this Latvian Division has held its ground in an exemplary fashion whilst engaged in defensive combat. It shows clear evidence of having been influenced by the personality of its commander. The high combat value of his unit can be credited to the decisiveness, energetic leadership and personal devotion to duty displayed by the divisional commander, SS-Gruppenführer Streckenbach. In these 9 major days of combat the Russians suffered heavy losses in men at the hands of the 19. Waffen-Gren.Div. der SS. They also sustained the following materiel losses to the Division in this time: 1 aircraft (to infantry weapons), 18 tanks (including 8 to close combat weapons), 1 assault gun, 18 anti-tank guns, 12 trucks, 26 medium and heavy mortars, 44 heavy machine-guns, 156 light machine-guns, and numerous additional war materiel. 104 prisoners were also captured (including 4 deserters). In these days of bitter forest combat along a wide front, the Division inflicted such heavy losses on 3 attacking Russian divisions that the enemy was forced to call off their assault on the 01.01.1945. The defensive resolve of this Division laid the groundwork for the crushing defeat sustained by the Russian 22nd Army during the first days of January.”
00.00.1945 Ärmelband "Kurland"

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Bruno Streckenbach (7 February 1902 – 28 October 1977) was born in Hamburg, Germany on 7 February 1902. His highest education was Gymnasium, which he left in April 1918 to voluntarily report to the German Army during World War I. Just like his close colleagues Erwin Schulz and Heinrich Himmler, he never served on the front lines of the battlefield due to the ceasefire that took place in November 1918.

After the end of the First World War, he was an active member of the Freikorps Bahrenfeld, which took part in the 1920 Kapp-Putsch. He was employed as a wholesale merchant, tried his hand at advertising, being a radio editor and also trying to establish himself as the director of a local office.

1933 was a huge year for many soon-to-be SS and police officers. As some historians have mentioned, for people like Streckenbach, 1933 was the year in which they assumed positions of the Gestapo (Political Police), but also the year which they were put into “leadership positions, posts they would hardly have occupied without the National Socialist seizure of power.” Following the Reichstag Fire on 27 February 1933 which the Nazis falsely propagated to be “communist-led,” there was a suspension of constitutional rights in the Weimar Republic, which increased the power of the government. Protests occurred and subsequently severe persecution towards left-wing politicians followed the Presidential Decree for the Protection of Volk and State on 28 February. In the March 5 Reichstag Elections, the National Socialists won power, although only upon merging with the Deutschnationale Volkspartei. After having the majority vote, the Nazi's seized full power. Persecution against political opponents and Jews increased, as did incidence of brutal assault, sporadic murder, and arson. It was during this seizure of power that many of the future leaders of the RSHA were given their first positions in the party.

More than a quarter of the future RSHA leaders had already been police officers in their respective home towns before 1933. In 1933, almost two-thirds of these men were given political police positions in their towns or cities, or sent to Berlin as a part of the Gestapo Office. Streckenbach himself only entered the police force on 31 August 1931 as the leader of the SS-Sturmbanner in Hamburg, Streckenbach's placement as chief of the Gestapo in Hamburg illustrates the “superficiality of professional continuity” – referring to the lack of qualifications many candidates possessed – as some historians characterize the Nazi Party's seizure of power. For years, these young radical right-wing militants had been marginalized, but with the rise of the Nazis, they were now given the chance to pursue a career which preserved their radical and violent worldviews, and indeed encouraged such behaviour. Historian Bradley Smith argues that the Nazi seizure of power offered these young men, including Bruno Streckenbach, a career which abided by and even enhanced their radicalism, and provided professional advancements which they had failed to receive in their careers up to this point.

Reinhard Heydrich and Himmler were always trying to expand their power and authority beyond the confines of the German Reich. In accordance with Hitler's notion of Lebensraum, active persecution against Polish people, and long-term goals of “conquering extensive territories in the Soviet Union”, Hitler and other top Nazi leadership started preparing for a war, marked by the invasion of Poland. In preparation for the invasion of Poland, Heydrich expressed his ambition of having mobilized killing squads, a “fighting administration” as he put it.

The Einsatzgruppen were in charge of securing German power and occupational authority in Poland through terror, furthering the ideology of ethnic cleansing and Lebensraum via deportations out of the occupied territory and mass executions within. The number of Einsatzgruppen corresponded to the Wehrmacht army units deployed. The leaders of the Sicherheitspolizei (SiPo; Security Police) in Berlin selected the office heads of the Einsatzgruppen very carefully, most of them being prior SD members or leaders. The members of the Einsatzgruppen— 500 men per Einsatzgruppe— were taken from local SS and police stations near the five units’ locations.

After the war, Bruno Streckenbach testified that Werner Best had directed deployment orders directly to him at the end of July or beginning of August. Streckenbach immediately left Hamburg to drive to Vienna, where he was deployed as head of Einsatzgruppe I. The German Wehrmacht invaded Poland on the morning of 1 September 1939. The Einsatzgruppen followed after them sending reports back to Berlin detailing the actions of Operation Tannenberg, the code name given to the anti-Polish extermination action carried out by the SD and SiPo in Poland during the opening weeks of the war. It was Streckenbach's task to oversee four districts as Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei im General Gouvernement: Warsaw, Krakow, Radom and Lublin. In each of these districts, thousands of Polish intellectuals—many former officers, professors, teachers, or politicians—were arrested and soon after, murdered. Streckenbach detailed the mission of the Einsatzgruppen: they were to seize and destroy all political and racial enemy groups, such as leftists, Roma, Polish resistance and Jews. In addition, they were to report on and evaluate material seized during the campaign and to gather information from agents among the Soviet population. Streckenbach ordered all enemies of the Third Reich to be deported to concentration camps and there to be executed. Jews were especially singled out for Sonderbehandlung ("special treatment"), a process that entailed particularly brutal beatings. On 9 November 1941 he was promoted to SS-Gruppenführer und Generalleutnant der Polizei.

By the end of 1939, the Einsatzgruppen were permanent units of the RSHA. Many members of the RSHA worked alongside the Einsatzgruppen in implementing brutal violence and mass murder throughout Poland. In May 1940, thousands of Poles were reported as liquidated. At the end of this month, Streckenbach had reported that “sentencing by martial law” was completed, with over 8,500 persons–whether accused as being “career criminals” or summoned to “summary sentencing”–were either already executed or would be shortly.

During his time in Poland, he had earned a reputation as the ruthless chief, who fought with such determination and mercilessness to eradicate any, and all, Nazi opponents.

Historian Michael Wildt suggests a stark increase in the activation of Streckenbach's radicalness from his time as a Gestapo chief in Hamburg to his first few months as the head of Einsatzgruppe I in Poland. Wildt notes the difference in responsibilities, going from arrests, abuses, assaults and killings of prisoners to the mindset of extermination of large groups of people. More than just a racial justification, Wildt suggests that Streckenbach's first few months as head of Einsatzgruppe I escalated into a murderous ideology that was unconceivable before this position.

Most of the previous SD men who were now employed in the Einsatzgruppen hadn't inflicted such murderous activity on so many people up until this point. As Wildt suggests, the deployment in Poland for the Einsatzgruppen was a defining moment for how policing matters were to be handled. It was these men's “first experience as racist mass murderers”. The deportations to the General-Gouvernement came from the Reich as well as newly “Germanized” territories which Germany had taken from Poland, removed the local “opponents”–Jews, Poles, Roma, and “asocial persons”–and replaced with ethnic Germans. During the late months of 1939, a span of eight weeks consisted of the execution of over 60,000 people by the Nazi forces, including by the Einsatzgruppen. Hitler insisted that this “harsh ethnic battle” could only be defeated without any internal resistance or legal restrictions upon implementation. Furthermore, the RSHA was the appropriate department for this “ethnic battle."

At the beginning of 1941, the attack on Soviet Union was first discussed among leaders of the RSHA. In March 1941, Heydrich informed a small circle of leaders, including Streckenbach, about the offensive that was to take place. The Wehrmacht army would lead and the Einsatzgruppen would secure the area after Soviets had been defeated. Streckenbach volunteered his unit's but Heydrich decided differently.

Streckenbach had commissioned the Personnel and Administration Office Leaders, advising them to prepare for deployment. In May 1941, Streckenbach called on his long-time colleague Erwin Schulz to prepare his men in the Leadership School of the Security Police in Berlin-Charlottenberg for deployment after just having completed their training as Criminal Police inspectors. Streckenbach sent them to Pretzsch, where they were to assume leadership status of the Einsatzkommando. These young soldiers, many of them recent college graduates, came motivated to fight and impress authority. The Einsatzgruppen were divided and formed in Pretzsch in May 1941. Streckenbach, Müller and Heydrich had the most authority in dispersing directions of the Einsatzkommandos in Pretzsch leading up to the offensive on the Soviet Union. Furthermore, in Otto Ohlendorf's Nuremberg Trial, he testified that Bruno Streckenbach had communicated the “order for the Final Solution” to the Einsatzgruppen.

Himmler and Hitler's actions following the assassination attempt and death of Heydrich were particularly vengeful. Hitler stated in reference to the Czechs who killed Heydrich, whenever you “kill someone, what results is always worse.” Streckenbach was called to Prague following the 4 June death of Heydrich. Himmler deemed the situation dire, the head of the RSHA having been killed with such abruptness.

Despite considering many leaders to assume Heydrich's position, Himmler decided to lead the RSHA himself. While Himmler was the head of the RSHA, Streckenbach — along with each of the other RSHA office heads — had near-full autonomy in deciding the internal structure of their respective divisions. Himmler focused his efforts on ensuring that Western European Jews be sent to extermination camps as efficiently and completely as possible, allowing the office heads like Streckenbach to control how it was done.

At the end of July 1942, Himmler named Streckenbach his representative as the legal authority of the RSHA. This essentially gave the latter absolute authority in deciding disciplinary cases regarding members of the RSHA. After Streckenbach had served as RSHA chief for about six months, Himmler concluded that a successor had to be publicly named. Bruno Streckenbach's responsibilities and qualifications were highly regarded and far exceeded expectations, and for this reason he was largely considered the best candidate for the position. Historian Tuviah Friedmann speculated that Himmler saw Streckenbach in some regards as having far too much power in his hands, possibly even seeing him as professional competition. To this day however, it is still unknown why Streckenbach was not appointed for the position of head of the RSHA, and Ernst Kaltenbrunner was chosen instead.

Hitler and Himmler wanted to name Streckenbach as the Senior SS and Police Leader of the Alpenland in Salzburg, Austria. Extremely disappointed, nonetheless, Streckenbach declined and in a personal letter to Himmler, requested to be placed in a military position.

Streckenbach trained in Hilversum, Holland with an antitank unit (as an Untersturmführer) in the beginning of 1943, and quickly advanced through the ranks of the Waffen-SS, even for being a senior SS leader. He was a regiment and division leader of the 8th SS Cavalry Division Florian Geyer and went on to lead the 19th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS (2nd Latvian) in the offensive against the Soviet Union in 1944 as a general. On 10 May 1945, Streckenbach and his division were taken prisoner in the Courland Pocket by the Soviet army. He remained a Soviet prisoner of war until 9 October 1955, when he was sent back to Hamburg.

When Streckenbach returned to Hamburg, he was informed that he faced charges for actions he had taken as the city's Gestapo chief. He was accused of beating someone in the kidneys; however after further investigation, the state prosecutor could not obtain the appropriate documents which provided evidence of the charges.

During the Nuremberg Trials, Streckenbach's name was continuously mentioned in court papers, among which was a testimony from Otto Ohlendorf who, as mentioned before, identified Streckenbach as one who had directed the Einsatzgruppen towards implementation of the Final Solution. However, the Hamburg State Prosecutor's Office concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to prove that his actions conflicted with the extant governing laws of the National Socialist rule. It was the case that many inhumane acts taken by the former Nazi members; as Wildt says, the assumption that National Socialism was synonymous with the “German Dictatorship rendered indivisible” the murderous acts that the party had taken in eastern and southern Europe and the Soviet Union.

In 1957, state prosecutors in Germany began discovering the unfathomable atrocities and millions of deaths of Soviet Jews culminating in the Ulm Einsatzkommando trial. His case prompted the 1959 establishment of the Central Office of State Justice Administration for the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes (Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Aufklärung der nationalsozialistischen Gewaltverbrechen) in Ludwigsburg. In the early 1960s, the office discovered a document providing evidence of deployment orders to Criminal Police and Gestapo officers that incited murderous activity. The court ordered the resumption of the investigation of crimes committed by Bruno Streckenbach.

On 30 June 1973, a bill of indictment for the murder of at least a million people was brought. Streckenbach, who was suffering from serious heart disease at the time, claimed ineligibility notwithstanding the strains a trial might place on his health. On 20 September 1974, the Hanseatic Appellate Court confirmed a diagnosis postponing trial commencement indefinitely. Bruno Streckenbach never had to answer for his part in the Nazi regime. He died on 28 October 1977 in Hamburg, Germany.

Chief of the Reich Security Main Office and Deputy Protector in Bohemia and Moravia SS-Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich (centre) in conversation with SS-Gruppenführer Bruno Streckenbach (right) at the inauguration of the Reich School of the Security Police and Security Service (RSSPSD) in Prague on April 16, 1942; far left is SS-Oberführer Erwin Schulz (1900–1981).

Source :
Bundesarchiv photo collection
https://de.metapedia.org/wiki/Streckenbach,_Bruno
https://www.holocausthistoricalsociety.org.uk/contents/germanbiographies/brunostreckenbach.html
https://www.tracesofwar.com/persons/14001/Streckenbach-Bruno.htm