By: Douglas E. Nash
Here is the recommendation for the award of the Eichenlaub to the Ritterkreuz for SS-Gruppenführer Heinz Reinefarth, submitted by his commander, SS-Obergruppenführer Erich von dem Bach. A couple of things worth noting: it does not mention civilian deaths at all, only that of "Bandits" (Banden, which I have more correctly labeled here as "insurgents" in my translation. Another thing is that he established his forward headquarters in an omnibus (I've seen the pictures, but didn't know that was his forward CP). Lastly, I was unaware that he had himself flown over the city in a Stuka in order to better determine where his heavy weapons (and Stukas) could be most profitably employed. Also noteworthy in the text that Reinefarth was to be found close to the front line at various times leading and exhorting his troops. Whether that is true or not, I don't know but it makes a good write up. Anyway, this was submitted to the Führerhauptquartier for approval on 9 September 1944 while the battle of Warsaw was still raging! It was approved by Hitler on 30 September. Here is the justification:
Brief explanation
1) The overall situation in Warsaw demanded that the east-west thoroughfare [i.e., Litzmannstadt Boulevard] to be cleared by the ruthless personal commitment of the Kampfgruppe commander. Gruppenführer Reinefarth directed the operation from the Kampfgruppen command post - an omnibus - which was located immediately behind the fighting troops. Only this measure, which contradicted every basic tactical principle, of tying oneself directly to the fighting troops in terms of leadership, was done in order to have the closest possible contact with officers and men day and night, and to be able to immediately play a decisive role in the fighting.
The basis for the successes was the ability to intervene personally in the conduct of the battle.
The fighting strength [of the Kampfgruppe], which was strengthened by bringing in units from SS-Gruppenführer Reinefarth's home service area and by other supporting units especially foreign formations, required a cohesive organization. It was possible within a few days to assemble a force from 31 different formation that was strong in every respect.
The decisive success of this battle can be attributed to the fact that Reinefarth personally took over the command and control of [overcoming] seemingly insurmountable obstacles, such as barricades and fortress-like strong points.
On 7 August 1944, when the attacking front had reached the fork in the road about 400 meters west of the Market Hall area in the Eisgrubenstrasse after overcoming 3 particularly strong barricades, and the further attack on the Market Hall with the aim of pushing through to the Wehrmacht Kommandantur had stalled due to strongest enemy resistance, Gruppenführer Reinefarth personally took over command and leadership of the operation. His personal bravery, demonstrated while leading the fighting, gave all of his combat troops the incentive to give their last [ounce of effort]. Thus, it was possible to carry out the main objective, the relief of the Wehrmacht commander General Rainer Stahel, who had been trapped [in the Brühl Palace] since 1 August 1944. On the same day it was possible to push all the way through to the Vistula.
This decisive act shattered the bandits' plan to cut off supplies to the Eastern Front [by seizing the bridges over the Vistula].
2) By his quick and decisive action, which was demonstrated within a few hours after regrouping [his] forces, Gruppenführer Reinefarth was able to achieve the goal of encircling the northern part of the city, in order to cut off the [Polish Home Army’s] supply routes for weapons and ammunition, as well as a connection between them, by concentrating the use of all of [his battle group’s] weapons. Gruppenführer Reinefarth repeatedly showed his tactical skills, personal readiness and decisiveness, especially during the execution of his plan of action.
The goal of defeating the [insurgents] in the northern part of the city [by forcing them into] the smallest possible space in order to destroy them, which forced them to raise the white flag was achieved in the morning hours of 2 September 1944, after a hasty attempt [by the insurgents] to break out had been thwarted on August 31, 1944.
The success mentioned in the daily Wehrmacht Report is, apart from the merit of each individual officer and man, a [testimony to the] merit of Gruppenführer Reinefarth, in that he, never tiring, was at every hour an example to the fighting troops by his own commitment in the front line. By the previous deliberate deployment of his formations, the march through Warsaw from east to west over the two upper [Vistula] bridges was thus ensured.
3) Taking advantage of what had been achieved so far, in only a few hours Gruppenführer Reinefarth reorganized his combat group and set it on a second all-out attack along the Vistula River in a thrust from north to south with the objective of capturing the [insurgents] in the city center. This objective was achieved on 9 September 1944. That this goal was achieved is the merit of the Gruppenführer Reinefarth, who embodies in himself the soldierly concepts of bravery, mature skill and superior calm.
4) In order to get an appreciation of the effect of his heavy weapons and how best to use the Luftwaffe, but especially how they could best be used against the roadblocks, barricades and pockets of resistance, Gruppenführer Reinefarth flew on a Stuka mission on 4 and 7 September 1944. The results of his reconnaissance became the basis for further tactical measures, which already had [been having] a successful effect. In the toughest street fighting of this battle, the peculiarity of the fight made it necessary to act not only a leader, but also a vanguard [of the attacking force]. These two conditions are expressed not least in the successes achieved so far [by Kampfgruppe Reinefarth].
Source :
https://www.facebook.com/groups/691098008051629/posts/1617020382126049/
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