Günter Braake (10 April 1921 - 21 May 2016) received the Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes on 27 August 1944 as Oberleutnant and stellvertretender Führer I.Bataillon / Grenadier-Regiment 422 / 126.Infanterie-Division.
Braake’s Ritterkreuz recommendation reads as follows…
“Oberleutnant Braake has outstandingly distinguished himself during the eastern campaign as a Bataillon adjutant and Kompanie commander. Despite his youth he has been assigned acting command of a Bataillon, and in this role he has demonstrated exemplary leadership qualities and personal readiness for duty during critical situations.
At around 11:00 on the 01.08.1944, following a short but powerful bombardment by mortars and light artillery, the 257th and 259th Guards rifle regiments (of the Russian 69th Guards Rifle Division) attacked the sector of the I./Grenadier-Regiment 422, which was located on the western bank of the Pododze creek (southwest of Schwanenburg). After a hard fight, and due to the combined effects of their large numerical superiority and our own significant losses, the enemy succeeded in achieving a ~350 metre wide penetration at their chosen focal point on both sides of the village of Maderniecki after about an hour of combat. The enemy knew that they would need to send the third regiment of their division (the 253rd) along with numerous heavy weapons into the breach as reinforcements within the shortest possible time. At around 13:30 the forward enemy elements were being contained within the primeval forest terrain near the Bataillon command post by the Bataillon staff and the 1./Pionier-Bataillon 126 (the latter having been deployed as construction workers in the area).
This major enemy penetration in the right regimental sector created a particularly critical situation for the Regiment. The Regiment could not request any additional reserves from the Division on this day, as these had already been dispatched days ago to the hard-fighting right neighbouring regiment. The frontline south of the break-in position up to the right regimental boundary was only weakly occupied, and so any hostile attempt to expand their penetration to the south would have no problems in swiftly doing so. This extremely challenging situation for the Division was made even more difficult by the terrain conditions in the area.
A short time after the enemy’s drumfire-like bombardment, Oberleutnant Braake, commander of I. Bataillon, recognized that the enemy’s probable focal point was in the Maderniecki area on the right wing of the left Kompanie. He thus guided the fire of the heavy weapons and artillery onto this sector and went forwards to this hotspot of the combat. After he found the frontline in his right sector to be in friendly hands he came up from the south and identified the already existing penetration in the vicinity of Maderniecki.
As he was unable to make contact with either his command post or the Regiment, this young Bataillon commander made a particularly bold and on-the-spot decision to strip the right part of his sector of its forces. He took 3. Kompanie (which was emplaced in this area) out of its sector without leaving any troops behind and then moved northwards to the break-in point within a remarkably short time. Here he initially sealed off the southwards-facing front of the penetration, and by doing so resolved the greatest danger for the Regiment. Moving from this hotspot, he then rushed to his Bataillon staff, which by now was in close combat with the lead enemy elements. There he used his assigned regimental Pionier-Zug to seal off the forward part of the break-in point in order to prevent a further advance by strong enemy forces into the dense swampy terrain.
Telephone communications with the Regiment were temporarily restored, and he reported that the penetration had been contained. This meant that the preconditions for an elimination of this penetration were completed. During this conversation he received word that the penetration had been sealed off to the north by the Regiment’s 9. (Sturm) Kompanie. He furthermore received the task of using his 3. Kompanie to launch a counterthrust from the south in order to link up with 9. (Sturm) Kompanie, which was doing likewise from the north. Telephone communications to I. Bataillon were thereafter interrupted for some time.
Oberleutnant Braake immediately rushed to 3. Kompanie in order to launch his part of the attack along the old frontline. He personally led the bold strike of 3. Kompanie, doing so with such energy that decisive results were produced after about an hour of combat. By this time the 1 km wide point of penetration was narrowed down to 250 metres following advances by the attacking spearheads from both the north and south. Heavy losses were inflicted on the enemy, and desperate radio transmissions were intercepted that revealed that the bulk of the enemy’s 3 attacking regiments along with many heavy weapons were encircled.
In this moment the friendly attack threatened to stall along both sides of a large forest clearing. Oberleutnant Braake recognized this crisis and rushed leftwards towards the 1./Pionier-Bataillon 126, which was still sealing off the breach. Acting on his own initiative, he ordered this unit to immediately attack into this breach towards the east. This attack meant that the enemy now had the impression that they were being attacked on all sides, and total confusion ensued. The bulk of their infantry and about 20 guns tried to escape through the narrow corridor in a disordered rout. However in their haste they were unable to avoid devastating losses in the face of the combined attacks from the front, south and north.
Realizing that a great success was imminent, Oberleutnant Braake once again placed himself at the head of small attacking groups and led them forwards. He captured an enemy anti-tank gun at the hotspot of the combat with 2 men in his immediate vicinity, eliminated the crew and used this gun to eliminate the crew of a second anti-tank gun. Rushing from one hotspot to another, he led the Kompanien attacking from the south and west towards their objective with great energy.
A particularly critical situation for the continuation of the Division’s defensive fighting in the sector of the right-wing Bataillon was resolved through the mastering of the difficulties in the sector of this Bataillon.
The critical situation in the Regimental sector was reversed due to the bold determination and personal bravery of Oberleutnant Braake. His energetic leadership during the counterattack was also a deciding factor.
The enemy sustained the following losses during the counterattack:
6 anti-tank guns (4.5 cm)
2 anti-tank guns (7.62 cm)
10 light machine-guns
4 heavy machine-guns
1 minesweeping device
11 prisoners
About 100-150 counted dead."
“Oberleutnant Braake has outstandingly distinguished himself during the eastern campaign as a Bataillon adjutant and Kompanie commander. Despite his youth he has been assigned acting command of a Bataillon, and in this role he has demonstrated exemplary leadership qualities and personal readiness for duty during critical situations.
At around 11:00 on the 01.08.1944, following a short but powerful bombardment by mortars and light artillery, the 257th and 259th Guards rifle regiments (of the Russian 69th Guards Rifle Division) attacked the sector of the I./Grenadier-Regiment 422, which was located on the western bank of the Pododze creek (southwest of Schwanenburg). After a hard fight, and due to the combined effects of their large numerical superiority and our own significant losses, the enemy succeeded in achieving a ~350 metre wide penetration at their chosen focal point on both sides of the village of Maderniecki after about an hour of combat. The enemy knew that they would need to send the third regiment of their division (the 253rd) along with numerous heavy weapons into the breach as reinforcements within the shortest possible time. At around 13:30 the forward enemy elements were being contained within the primeval forest terrain near the Bataillon command post by the Bataillon staff and the 1./Pionier-Bataillon 126 (the latter having been deployed as construction workers in the area).
This major enemy penetration in the right regimental sector created a particularly critical situation for the Regiment. The Regiment could not request any additional reserves from the Division on this day, as these had already been dispatched days ago to the hard-fighting right neighbouring regiment. The frontline south of the break-in position up to the right regimental boundary was only weakly occupied, and so any hostile attempt to expand their penetration to the south would have no problems in swiftly doing so. This extremely challenging situation for the Division was made even more difficult by the terrain conditions in the area.
A short time after the enemy’s drumfire-like bombardment, Oberleutnant Braake, commander of I. Bataillon, recognized that the enemy’s probable focal point was in the Maderniecki area on the right wing of the left Kompanie. He thus guided the fire of the heavy weapons and artillery onto this sector and went forwards to this hotspot of the combat. After he found the frontline in his right sector to be in friendly hands he came up from the south and identified the already existing penetration in the vicinity of Maderniecki.
As he was unable to make contact with either his command post or the Regiment, this young Bataillon commander made a particularly bold and on-the-spot decision to strip the right part of his sector of its forces. He took 3. Kompanie (which was emplaced in this area) out of its sector without leaving any troops behind and then moved northwards to the break-in point within a remarkably short time. Here he initially sealed off the southwards-facing front of the penetration, and by doing so resolved the greatest danger for the Regiment. Moving from this hotspot, he then rushed to his Bataillon staff, which by now was in close combat with the lead enemy elements. There he used his assigned regimental Pionier-Zug to seal off the forward part of the break-in point in order to prevent a further advance by strong enemy forces into the dense swampy terrain.
Telephone communications with the Regiment were temporarily restored, and he reported that the penetration had been contained. This meant that the preconditions for an elimination of this penetration were completed. During this conversation he received word that the penetration had been sealed off to the north by the Regiment’s 9. (Sturm) Kompanie. He furthermore received the task of using his 3. Kompanie to launch a counterthrust from the south in order to link up with 9. (Sturm) Kompanie, which was doing likewise from the north. Telephone communications to I. Bataillon were thereafter interrupted for some time.
Oberleutnant Braake immediately rushed to 3. Kompanie in order to launch his part of the attack along the old frontline. He personally led the bold strike of 3. Kompanie, doing so with such energy that decisive results were produced after about an hour of combat. By this time the 1 km wide point of penetration was narrowed down to 250 metres following advances by the attacking spearheads from both the north and south. Heavy losses were inflicted on the enemy, and desperate radio transmissions were intercepted that revealed that the bulk of the enemy’s 3 attacking regiments along with many heavy weapons were encircled.
In this moment the friendly attack threatened to stall along both sides of a large forest clearing. Oberleutnant Braake recognized this crisis and rushed leftwards towards the 1./Pionier-Bataillon 126, which was still sealing off the breach. Acting on his own initiative, he ordered this unit to immediately attack into this breach towards the east. This attack meant that the enemy now had the impression that they were being attacked on all sides, and total confusion ensued. The bulk of their infantry and about 20 guns tried to escape through the narrow corridor in a disordered rout. However in their haste they were unable to avoid devastating losses in the face of the combined attacks from the front, south and north.
Realizing that a great success was imminent, Oberleutnant Braake once again placed himself at the head of small attacking groups and led them forwards. He captured an enemy anti-tank gun at the hotspot of the combat with 2 men in his immediate vicinity, eliminated the crew and used this gun to eliminate the crew of a second anti-tank gun. Rushing from one hotspot to another, he led the Kompanien attacking from the south and west towards their objective with great energy.
A particularly critical situation for the continuation of the Division’s defensive fighting in the sector of the right-wing Bataillon was resolved through the mastering of the difficulties in the sector of this Bataillon.
The critical situation in the Regimental sector was reversed due to the bold determination and personal bravery of Oberleutnant Braake. His energetic leadership during the counterattack was also a deciding factor.
The enemy sustained the following losses during the counterattack:
6 anti-tank guns (4.5 cm)
2 anti-tank guns (7.62 cm)
10 light machine-guns
4 heavy machine-guns
1 minesweeping device
11 prisoners
About 100-150 counted dead."
Source :
https://www.emedals.com/a-post-war-signed-picture-of-kc-recipient-oberleutnant-gunter-braake
http://thirdreichpictures2.blogspot.com/2018/04/gunter-braake.html
https://www.tracesofwar.com/persons/28627/Braake-G%FCnter.htm?c=aw
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