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Wednesday, March 25, 2020

SS-Obersturmbannführer Hans Dorr After Got the Schwerter

 SS-Obersturmbannführer Hans Dorr in a studio picture after he received the Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes mit Eichenlaub und Schwertern #77 on 9 July 1944 as Kommandeur of SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 9 "Germania" / 5.SS-Panzer-Division "Wiking".

Dorr’s Schwertern recommendation reads as follows…

“1.) Orlowez (31.01.-05.02.1944):

Strong enemy attacks in the sector of the 57. Infanterie-Division necessitated that the Korps pull back its front from Smela to Orlowez. SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt. 9 Germania was deployed east of Orlowez for defense. The Soviets were favoured by the hilly and ravine-covered terrain, and they were able to assemble strong forces before the Regiment’s frontline and then immediately use them for an attack against Orlowez. A bitter struggle ensued, and it lasted for 6 days. The Soviets launched multiple attacks each day with a varying strength of 400-1000 men against the thin lines of the Regiment, however every time these attacks faltered against the determined defense.

The high-water mark of the battle for Orlowez was on the night of the 02./03.02.1944, wherein the Soviets commenced an overwhelming attack against Hill 202.4 (located southeast of Orlowez). An enemy regiment, heavily supported by artillery, was to advance along a narrow front through Orlowez and onto Gorodischtsche. By this they would deliver the deathblow to the bitterly fighting defenders of the pocket. Following ferocious close combat the Soviets succeeded in getting onto Hill 202.4, located in the sector of II. Bataillon. The enemy attempted to expand their breach with swiftly brought-up reserves.

Undeterred by the strong enemy attacks against the front of his own Bataillon, SS-Sturmbannführer Dorr decided to remove units from his own Bataillon’s line and use them for an immediate counterthrust in the sector of II. Bataillon. A reinforced Zug launched such a maneuver under his personal leadership. Firing an MG from the hip, SS-Sturmbannführer Dorr stormed ahead of his Zug and halted the enemy forces that had entered into Orlowez. A Zug from II. Bataillon then launched an attack against the point of penetration in order to close the breach. The attack succeeded, and the enemy units behind our now closed front were surrounded. After a hard, 12-hour long night battle it was possible to eliminate the trapped enemy forces while defeating all attempt hostile breakout and relief efforts. The destroyed enemy group sustained losses as follows:

5 guns (7.5 cm)
6 guns (4.7 cm)
13 heavy machine-guns
9 heavy mortars
300 dead (counted)
83 prisoners.

2.) Arbusino (09.-11.02.1944):

The Regiment was deployed in the Arbusino area, east of Korsun. On the 10.02.1944 it received the order to hand over its sector to the SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt. 10 Westland and in turn take over a sector of frontline near Schanderowka.

The relief was supposed to take place on the night of the 10./11.02.1944. However the enemy situation before the Regiment Westland prevented a timely completion of such a maneuver, and so it lasted until the morning of the next day. For their part the enemy had been spotted bringing up reinforcements on the previous two days and setting up assembly areas. They did not fail to notice the relief maneuver and the opportunity it provided, and so they launched an attack with strong forces at 05:00 on the 11.02.1944. The defending I. Bataillon, weakened in its defensive readiness by the ongoing relief movement, defended fiercely but was unable to prevent an enemy penetration. The foe was quick to send in additional forces, with the ultimate aim of pushing ahead to Arbusino and taking the bridge located there. From here they could break through to Korsun itself. As such the Division decided to immediately pull back Regiment Westland to the Arbusino river.

Recognizing the gravity of the situation, SS-Sturmbannführer Dorr at once launched a counterthrust on his own initiative with 1. Kompanie (which had already been taken out of the line) in order to ensure that the withdrawal to the new position could go according to plan. He and his men assailed the enemy’s lead elements, threw them back in an energetic attack and captured a commanding hill northeast of Arbusino. Control of this hill was decisive. If the enemy had been able to set up observation posts here they would have been able to bring down observed fire on the Arbusino river. From the ranks of his small group SS-Sturmbannführer Dorr bitterly defending this high ground until the Regiment Westland had occupied the Arbusino sector. Then the 1. Kompanie and its Bataillon commander pulled back to this same position while under continual fire from the hotly pursuing enemy.

3.) Schanderowka (12.-14.02.1944):

At 00:00 on the 12.02.1944 the Regiment was deployed for an attack against Schanderowka. Its mission was to launch a surprise attack during the night that would take control of this city, which was heavily occupied and strongly fortified by the enemy. The intent of the higher commands was: Secure the required assembly areas for the later breakout from the pocket through the capture of the city. The success of this assault was therefore of truly decisive importance. In addition to an enemy flamethrower battalion, already identified through friendly reconnaissance, the enemy had also brought up an infantry regiment for the defense of the city. Dorr’s Bataillon launched a wide flanking maneuver towards the south, and it was the first to break through the strong Soviet defensive ring (reinforced with several flamethrower barriers) and enter into the southern part of the city. There the initially surprised Soviets commenced a counterthrust. A bitter round of close combat ensued, and it would last throughout the entire night. The friendly attack stalled. At daybreak the Soviets plastered the part of the village our forces had taken with heavy fire from all available weapons.

Strong enemy air units supported the defenders in their battle. Resupply to our friendly elements that had entered Schanderowka was not possible, as all approach routes were dominated by the enemy’s fire. Our own artillery was likewise not able to deliver effective support to our hard-pressed infantry as observation posts could not be set up due to the unfavourable terrain. Despite being totally isolated SS-Sturmbannführer Dorr remained undeterred by these difficulties, and prepared for a renewed friendly assault on the night of the 12./13.02.1944. Our brave group of troops pressed forwards against the much superior enemy in a gruelling 12-hour night battle. Newly set up flamethrower barriers and minefields were overcome, and the enemy forces in the northern part of the city were pushed back.

However during the morning the attack once again ground to a halt under the strong enemy defensive fire after it had made it to the village centre. Over the course of the whole day the enemy’s tank-led counterthrusts were defeated with high losses for the foe. SS-Sturmbannführer Dorr prepared for the last, decisive attack against the northern part of the city, which was to take place on the following night starting at 22:00. Ultimately both the city and the commanding high ground to the west of it was wrested from the enemy. This decisive attack succeeded thanks to the energy, toughness and outstanding bravery of SS-Sturmbannführer Dorr. Always being with his men in the foremost line by both day and night, he was a permanent example of courage, endurance and confidence. In this manner he in turn inspired his men to praiseworthy achievements.

The following was destroyed or captured:

13 guns (7.5 cm)
20 guns (4.7 cm)
10 guns of all calibers
3 tanks
Over 70 heavy machine-guns
37 mortars
The load-out of an infantry regiment and a flamethrower battalion
Over 300 enemy dead (counted)
150 prisoners.

4.) Nowo-Buda (15.-16.02.1944):

After the capture of Schanderowka the heavily fought-out units of the Regiment were forced to immediately move towards the south. There they relieved elements of the 72. Infanterie-Division, cleared out the enemy-occupied southern part of Nowo-Buda and went over to the defense on the hills south of the village.

Following the capture of Schanderowka the enemy force-marched new units from the east and assembled them in the Morenzy area. They then began offensive operations on the 15.02.1944, supported by strong tank forces. Their aim was to thrust through to Schanderowka via Nowo-Buda and smash our own breakthrough forces that had been assembled in the area.

Over the course of a bitter 2-day struggle all enemy attacks were fended off, mostly in close combat. SS-Sturmbannführer Dorr again outstandingly distinguished himself here. The I. Bataillon found itself in the focus of the defensive battle. The weakly held front of the Regiment was broken through several times; however SS-Sturmbannführer Dorr repeatedly launched counterthrusts with hastily assembled shock units and resolved every critical situation. The enemy took heavy losses in men and materiel. Two enemy tanks were destroyed.

Here follows a captured report from the 5th Guards Red Banner Don-Cossack Cavalry Corps to the supreme commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front concerning the Guards Cavalry Don-Cossack Regiment 47, which was deployed near Nowo-Buda:

‘The bitter enemy artillery and mortar fire inflicted heavy losses on the regiment. The soil of Nowo-Buda flows with Cossack blood.’

5.) Breakthrough from the pocket west of Cherkassy (17.02.1944):

At 03:00 on the 17.02.1944 the Regiment (along with the subordinated Brigade ‘Wallonien’) commenced its breakthrough towards Lissjanka as the rearguard of the Division. Located far away from the attacking spearheads of the Division, the Regiment had the mission of smashing the attack of the Soviet reserves that now appeared on the battlefield while also forcing the breakout itself. The Korps units deployed to guard the flanks of the breakout wedge failed in their duties, and so the enemy succeeded in thrusting north to south and capturing the commanding ridges at Chilkie and Komarowka. Now every new friendly attack became pinned down under the enemy fire.

Thus SS-Sturmbannführer Dorr commenced an attack against the high ground north of Chilkie with his Bataillon on his own initiative. The hill was stormed with blank weapons. Through this decisive deed the breakout path through Chilkie that had been temporarily occupied by the enemy was free. The forward movement of all regimental elements as well as the withdrawal of the hard-pressed rearguards from the 57. Infanterie-Division was now possible.

Later on in the breakout the Dshurshenzy-Potschapinzy road became blocked by 12 enemy tanks. Another 7 enemy tanks bypassed the Regiment to the north and laid down a murderous fire on all friendly units located amongst the coverless terrain. Lingering here for any length of time would have led to extremely high losses, a fact SS-Sturmbannführer Dorr was well aware of. He thus assembled his Bataillon together and fearlessly stormed against the 12 tanks with blank weapons. Panzerfaust in hand, he inspired his men forwards through the strong enemy fire and personally destroyed a T-34. This deed, unexcelled in either courage or guts, was the shining beacon for thousands of German soldiers. They assailed the fire-front of the enemy tanks, overran all enemy resistance and reached the protection of the woods east of Oktjabr with minor losses. This led to a union with the friendly relief forces located at Lissyanka.

6.) Attack against the western part of Kovel and Hill 189.5 (17.04.1944):

During the fighting for ‘Fortress Kowel’ the enemy succeeded in taking over the western part of the city and Hill 189.5, located to the west of Kowel. The high ground around 189.5 was particularly dominating, and offered excellent observation possibilities for the enemy against the supply routes to Kowel. For his reason it was secured with a deeply-layered defensive system and several mine belts. As such, in order to deny the enemy their grip on the city and its supply routes, an operation was ordered to take place on the 17.04.1944. The aim was to seize the high ground and clear out the western part of the city.

The Kampfgruppe of SS-Sturmbannführer Dorr was assigned to attack Hill 189.5.

The unit moved out at 02:30, and it moved swiftly along the Kowel-Cholm railroad. It was not long before it had captured the enemy strongpoints located 1200 metres south of the railroad junction. It was now possible to launch the friendly attack against Hill 189.5 in a southerly direction. Sturmbannführer Dorr personally led the assault units and, achieving total surprise, they were able to enter into the enemy defensive system with blank weapons. The totally surprised enemy were pushed out of their important positions and fled to the high ground towards the south. SS-Sturmbannführer Dorr immediately took advantage of this favourable situation. He pursued the fleeing enemy and succeeded in also capturing the high ground after a bloody engagement. Now acting on his own initiative, he oriented a Kompanie towards the east. This unit entered into the western part of Kowel from the north and threw the enemy back towards the south. This decisive deed enabled the attack of the second group against the western part of Kowel (which had been pinned down by the enemy’s heavy defensive fire) to once again come into motion. The enemy was thrown back here as well, and the ordered attack objective was reached.

It was once again the personal intervention and outstanding bravery of SS-Sturmbannführer Dorr that was decisive for this successful outcome. The western part of the Fortress was completely cleared of the enemy, a commanding hill position taken and the friendly supply activity secured from the interference of the enemy.”










Source:
https://bildarchiv.bsb-muenchen.de/metaopac/start.do?View=bildarchiv
https://www.facebook.com/search/top/?q=knight%27s%20cross%20holders%20history%20%26%20research&epa=SEARCH_BOX
https://www.tracesofwar.com/persons/13247/Dorr-Hans.htm

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